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NO FUTURE 
Postmodernism holds a contentious place in contemporary social theory and 
philosophy, and is often considered nihilistic. Using the work of Nietzsche and 
Nishitani, I argue that nihilism is a stage in the dialectical transition away from a 
dominant form of thought and towards a radically new one. Drawing on Sartre’s 
theory of dialectical praxis and other elements of existentialist philosophy, I argue 
that postmodernism can act as a bridge towards a theory of praxis and engagement 
that allows a movement away from the condition of postmodern capitalism. This 
allows for an understanding of the contemporary conditions that is amenable to a 
materialist theory emphasising human activity rather than relying on metaphysical 
approaches, facilitating some rapprochement with Marxist philosophy. To 
conclude, I argue that postmodernism allows the opening up of future possibilities 
in response to their foreclosure by the bourgeois philosophy of idealism and 
universalism that currently dominates society. 
Keywords: Postmodernism, Marxism, Nihilism, Existentialism, Revolution, 
Postmodernity, Neoliberalism, Future-Orientation, Sociological Theory, Social 
Philosophy 
  
 
iii 
 
SUMMARY 
This thesis deals with the issue of how the points raised by postmodernism relate 
to the possibility of social revolution. In sociology, the idea of revolution is often 
connected to the ideas of Marx, and Marxist thinkers make certain assumptions 
about how and why a revolution will happen. Many Marxists reject the claims of 
postmodernism because they challenge these assumptions and the worldview that 
supports the idea of revolution as unavoidable. One criticism that is made about 
postmodernism is that it is a form of nihilism, which these critics say only rejects 
values and does not offer any new values of its own. I agree that postmodernism is 
a form of nihilism, but say that nihilism is a more complicated philosophy than 
that. In this essay, I offer a model of nihilism that is based on the idea of rejecting 
dominant values in order to accept a very different set afterwards. By accepting 
these new values, I think we can develop a stronger theory of revolution and 
connect it more closely with how people live and act in the world. In the end, I 
contend that we have to change how we understand the present and the future in 
order to have a proper revolution. Because of this, I see postmodernism as a tool 
for getting away from the assumptions and limits placed on thought and activity 
by the powerful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Postmodernism, as a form of nihilism that emerges from and in response to the 
conditions of contemporary capitalism and bourgeois ideology, offers us the 
ground to formulate a more complete theory of revolutionary praxis than other 
modes of thought. My understanding of the revolutionary project begins with the 
principles of Marx’s early philosophical and theoretical works, as well as his 
critique of alienation under capitalism, which outline the context of the 
contradictions within capitalism and provide an outline of a goal for revolution in 
terms of allowing the proletariat to escape bourgeois objectification. However, I 
find in orthodox approaches to Marxism a tendency towards a reification and 
universalisation of the economic form as well as a type of determinism, both of 
which are problematic tendencies. I believe that these tendencies are more in line 
with bourgeois philosophy and ideology than they are with revolutionary thought. 
To avoid appealing to bourgeois principles, I am bringing in the nihilist critique 
that was first developed by Nietzsche. This critique rejects the assumptions of 
Enlightenment thought and reveals the groundlessness of the system of knowledge 
that is derived from it. I am deploying postmodernism, which derives many of its 
principles from this nihilist approach, in order to transpose nihilism into a 
contemporary context. Taking up the perspective of nihilism, with its focus on 
human action and power projects in the world, I find that it is possible to return to 
the principles of Marx’s historical-materialist framework and to develop a theory 
of revolution that appeals to human activity rather than to principles or forces that 
transcend this world. Moreover, I believe that the development of this approach 
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and this theory entail a serious re-orientation of our perspective on the future and 
how revolutionary praxis is possible. 
 In the chapters that follow, I will establish the context of my theory in terms 
of both bourgeois thought and the particular organisation of capitalism. This 
requires a development of both the origin of bourgeois ideology in Enlightenment 
philosophy and rationalist positivism, as well as an explanation of the development 
of neoliberal capitalism and the changing economic role of the state. From there, I 
will explain the principles of nihilism in order to develop the idea of active nihilism 
as a tool of critique and the source of the potential for establishing a new set of 
values, rather than simply appealing to the old. In order to return to the 
contemporary, I will then connect nihilism to postmodernism, which critiques 
modernism as the dominant mode of bourgeois ideology. This critical aspect of 
postmodernism is, I believe, tremendously useful in grounding revolutionary 
praxis because it pushes for a style that is radically different from modernism. 
Ultimately, I will use this framing to build towards a call for re-orientation towards 
the future as a space for possible revolution, rejecting bourgeois models that favour 
the reproduction of the current social order. 
CONTEXT WITHIN THE LITERATURE 
In sociology and social theory, a question exists as to the possibility of 
revolutionary action and change. Whether or not a revolution is desirable and the 
means by which one should proceed to manage that desire are topics that have 
been debated throughout the history of the discipline. Its relation to the questions 
of revolution and social change also brings sociology into contact with larger 
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questions of power relations and the depth of their ties to the formation of 
knowledge and society as a whole. In order to understand revolution and to decide 
whether or not it is a good project to take up, we have to understand the context in 
which it emerges and what it is meant to accomplish. Within sociology, this debate 
began primarily with the work of Marx, who aimed to reject the approach to 
philosophy and theory that was dominant in Germany in the 19th century and to 
connect the study of society directly to human action (Marx and Engels 1998). 
Moreover, for Marx, the purpose of theory was specifically to direct change in the 
world, rather than simply to pursue description of natural phenomena (Marx 
1978b). A crucial part of Marx’s revolutionary philosophy was the model of class 
conflict, which emphasises the idea that the bourgeoisie, who own the means of 
production, and the proletariat, who make their living selling their labour, have 
conflicting interests and cannot co-exist in absolute harmony (Marx and Engels 
2002). It is as a result of this structural divide and the alienation that it engenders 
that the members of the proletariat can begin to consider and pursue revolutionary 
action, with alienation being a problem because it separates the living human being 
from properly grasping their own place in the world and the potential of praxis 
(Marx 1978a). While Marx provided the initial grounding for critical and 
revolutionary sociology, however, he did not fully explain the entire process of 
revolution and there have been several competing schools derived from his initial 
approach. 
 One of the most prominent schools of Marxism, orthodox Marxism, has the 
tendency to take the dialectic that Marx outlined and elevate it to the status of a 
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historical force, rather than seeing it as a tool of understanding (Albritton 1986). 
This elevation creates two problems in the discussion of revolution: it posits 
revolution as an inevitable conclusion, and it moves the focus away from human 
activity and towards the activity of this supposed dialectic. I find this to be an 
unacceptable position with regard to the principles of historical materialist 
analysis. An alternative approach to Marxism can be found within existentialist 
Marxism, based on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. In Search for a Method (1963), 
Sartre argued that Marxism and existentialism were complementary schools of 
thought and began a project of reconciliation between the two. Since existentialism 
is meant to focus on human activity as the source of meaning in human life, and 
since it connects human values directly to human activity (Sartre 2007), I find this 
approach much more in line with Marx’s own principles and goals. As such, the 
Sartrean approach to Marxism is the one I am using in this essay. 
 Sartre also offers the style of dialectic that I will be taking up for this essay. 
The dialectic must not be taken as something external to human activity, as such 
models only serve to objectify human being (Sartre 2004). With this in mind, the 
Sartrean style of dialectic is meant to connect philosophical thought back to human 
activity and understanding, and to tie the development of philosophy back to the 
factical conditions of life and the quest for emancipation (Sartre 1963). Since it is 
grounded in existentialism, however, this approach also maintains the aspects of 
projected being and praxis. It also maintains the idea that human beings are not 
created by divine power and do not have predetermined purposes in the world, 
which is central to the existentialist perspective (Sartre 1992). I find that the 
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principles of non-determinism and non-essentialism make this approach 
particularly useful when dealing with the question of the future as a space of 
possibility and how we, as active human beings, should relate to it in terms of 
potentially-revolutionary praxis. 
 The other major aspect of this essay is the epistemological critique offered 
by the postmodernists. Postmodernism is an approach that has been derided as 
nihilistic and anti-revolutionary, opposed to the principles of Marxism (Callinicos 
1990). Supposedly, the fact that postmodernist approaches reject absolute 
totalisations and do not offer many positive ontological claims, instead favouring 
an approach that emphasises difference and discontinuity, means that 
postmodernism cannot be amenable to revolutionary praxis (Callinicos 1990). I 
find, though, that this rejection relies too heavily on the acceptance of the model of 
orthodox Marxism and the denial of nihilism tout court. Postmodernism can 
certainly be seen as a form of nihilism (see Baudrillard 1994), but the problem is 
in how one conceives of nihilism. Orthodox Marxism is heavily influenced by 
positivist thought and, because of this, takes up positivist aims (Sartre 2004); and 
it is this influence that leads thinkers of this persuasion to be opposed to nihilism. 
In terms of postmodernism, this opposition is based on a lack of apparent positive 
content and a lack of faith in the imminence of revolution (Callinicos 1990). I 
contend, on the other hand, that this is primarily indicative of a poor 
understanding of nihilism and the goals of nihilist philosophers. 
 To develop a more complete and correct model of nihilism, I am drawing 
here on the work of Nishitani Keiji. Nishitani (1900 – 1990) was a Japanese 
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philosopher generally associated with the Kyoto School who examined the history, 
importance, and value of nihilism. In his book The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism 
(1990), Nishitani explains the history and the context of, specifically, Nietzsche’s 
thought and how it emerged as a response to the domination of European 
philosophy by the Enlightenment and positivism in the 19th century. Within 
Nietzsche’s work, there is not only a rejection of those dominant values, but a push 
for the affirmation of an alternative set of values which puts greater emphasis on 
human activity and the desire to create an alternative world (Nishitani 1990; 
Nietzsche 2003a; 2003c). In this essay, I will be using Nishitani’s work to develop 
a model of nihilism that focusses on that affirmative aspect in place of dominant 
values to show how nihilism does not demand negativity and how it re-centres 
human will and activity in the world, which allows a contact between nihilism and 
Marxism that is central to my theory of revolution. 
 The reconciliation of nihilism and Marxism is also possible through, again, 
existentialism. Like nihilism, existentialism rejects the idea of divine creation and 
an otherworldly force that gives humanity meaning (Sartre 1992). Nishitani (1990) 
discusses the way that Heidegger expanded on Nietzsche’s work to present a more 
complete philosophy of nihilism. Sartre (1992), in turn, builds on Heidegger’s work 
in developing existentialism, examining Heidegger’s claims and ideas, but with 
more of a focus on the human and human potential. Existentialism is not a 
positivist philosophy and it maintains nihilism’s confrontation of being with 
nothingness, but the more humanist style and Sartre’s expressed project of 
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unification with Marxism make it a useful tool in joining the two seemingly-
irreconcilable approaches of Marxism and postmodernism. 
 Ultimately, the literatures of Marxism, existentialism, and postmodernism 
are my three bases for this essay. I contend that these are complementary schools 
of thought and that, by examining their shared principles and goals, it is possible 
to develop a theory of revolution that foregrounds human activity and re-orients 
us towards the revolutionary possibility of the future. My theory is that revolution 
requires a radical breaking away from the principles and structures of bourgeois 
thought and an affirmation of the possibility of worldly change through human 
praxis. Connected to this is a belief that we must re-orient ourselves towards 
understanding the future as an indeterminate space for human praxis, the canvas 
on which we can inscribe our principles and realise our projects. Moreover, this is 
a theory that rejects the principles of bourgeois thought and responds specifically 
to the conditions of contemporary capitalism, making it more timely and historical 
than approaches aimed at the modelling of abstract and transhistorical forms. 
THE METHOD OF IMMANENT CRITIQUE 
What ties this essay together is a model of dialectical understanding of human 
activity and the emergence of different projects and schools of thought. Again, this 
is derived from the Sartrean model and recognises the emergence of philosophy as 
a response to factical socio-material conditions of life (Sartre 1963), and 
totalisation as necessarily ad hoc and temporary (Sartre 2004). Immanent critique 
is the method at the heart of dialectical models and unites the content of critical 
theories with their historical application (Antonio 1981). The model progresses by 
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examining the principles of a system and how they conflict with the practical reality 
of that system in order to reveal internal contradictions in the system’s logic, which 
can then be used to undermine the system (Antonio 1981). Marxism emerges as a 
response to the contradictions of capitalism, highlighting the phenomenon of 
alienation and the self-destructive tendency of the system as a whole. Nihilism 
emerges as a response to the contradictions within Enlightenment thought and 
positivism, rejecting the tendency to universalise and reify principles and 
connecting the emergence of the social system back to the pursuit of power and 
human projects. Postmodernism emerges as a response to the style of 
epistemological and ontological claims made under the modernism of 
contemporary bourgeois society, rejecting reification and the naturalisation of 
statistical models, as well as the negative tendency in bourgeois legitimation of 
capitalist domination. I see all of these theories as fundamentally critical, emerging 
as immanent critiques of schools of thought that are linked through their mutual 
development and support of bourgeois domination of society. As such, I find this 
to be another connection between these three basic approaches. 
 Because the styles I am trying to synthesise are so deeply tied to immanent 
critique, so is my own theory. My proposed model of revolution is based on the 
rejection of, and escape from, the values and assumptions entrenched in bourgeois 
society. In this sense, revolution must present a radical break or rupture from the 
existing system. Otherwise, instead of a revolution, we are offered a program of 
reform, which is inconsistent with Marx’s principles and tends instead towards a 
bourgeois socialism that maintains the overall form of capitalism (Marx and Engels 
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2002). I see contemporary society as inseparable from bourgeois ideology, but I 
also see that bourgeois ideology as deeply flawed. Revolution must be founded on 
human praxis, and so it must be understood as a conscious and willful response to 
the conditions in which people are living. As such, I will be using the logic of 
immanent critique throughout this essay; it is the only consistent method I can 
apply. 
PLAN OF ATTACK 
The body of this essay will begin with modelling the bourgeois ideology and its 
descent from Enlightenment principles and philosophy. I will begin here because 
I see bourgeois thought as the starting point for the critique of contemporary 
society. My model holds that the philosophy of the Enlightenment provided a 
ground for revolutionary bourgeois praxis but that over time, this mode of thought 
has been transformed into a more conservative ideology. I will attach the bourgeois 
ideology to principles of universalism, rationality, and perfectibility of the world, 
which are necessary elements in the way that the bourgeoisie defends its continued 
existence and continued domination of society. Understanding the principles of 
bourgeois thought and the transformation of bourgeois philosophy into bourgeois 
ideology provides a grounding for the rest of the essay and for the project of 
revolution, which must be oriented towards the establishment of some other set of 
values that is radically different from, and incompatible with, the bourgeois mode 
of thought. 
 The topic of the second chapter is the way that the bourgeoisie became the 
dominant class in society through developing capitalism as an economic form and 
10 
 
 
 
eventually subordinating the existence of the state to the maintenance of 
capitalism’s foundations. In this chapter, I will develop the idea of the bourgeoisie 
as a praxic class, one that used its praxis to make itself dominant and, once 
dominant, to reproduce the conditions of that dominance. I also trace the way that 
capitalism has been internally rearranged since its emergence. Included in these 
changes is the shift from modernity to postmodernity as bourgeois domination 
become more complete and the state was fully subsumed into the reproduction of 
the capitalist social order. Part of this shift to postmodernity is, I contend, the 
development of neoliberalism, which emerged in the 1970s and combines an 
economic policy of formal deregulation with state intervention to maintain the 
capitalist system and which, ideologically, emphasises individual freedoms and 
responsibilities above all else (Harvey 2005). Part of my analysis of neoliberalism 
and postmodernity is the idea of metastability as a tool for the defence of the 
capitalist system in the fact of class conflict. Because the process that enriches the 
bourgeois owning immiserates the proletarian working class, the two are locked in 
conflict (Marx and Engels 2002). As such, techniques are necessary to prevent this 
conflict from collapsing the overall economic structure and society with it. As part 
of neoliberalism, I describe these techniques as being part of metastability because 
they manage the crisis tendencies of capitalism from without. These internal 
changes, and the changes in material relations between classes they engender in 
turn, are also vital to understanding the scope and importance of revolution as a 
whole. Not only do they provide the worldly target of revolutionary activity, but the 
structural aspects of capitalism also serve to entrench the bourgeois ideology. As 
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such, the peculiarities of capitalism provide a necessary second point of context for 
the critique I will develop. 
 The third chapter addresses the elements of nihilism and the project of 
active nihilism directly. Contained in this chapter is my model of the dialectic of 
nihilism, in which nihilism acts as a negation of the dominant values of the times 
and a bridge towards the later negation of that negation by affirming a different set 
of values. Situated as a response to Enlightenment philosophy and the 
construction of bourgeois ideology, I cast nihilism as a useful tool in revealing the 
ultimate groundlessness of universalism and perfectibility of society, which allows 
for a more complete turn towards seeing the world in terms of praxis and conflict 
between groups. I will also emphasise the importance of understanding the idea of 
active nihilism, a type of philosophical approach that not only rejects dominant 
values but also affirms some other set. Adding positive content, as active nihilism 
does, offers a more useful critical approach than the alternative, passive nihilism, 
which stops at the point of rejection and meaninglessness. In a sense, passive 
nihilism can be understood as the acceptance of the lack of values in the world after 
universalism collapses, while active nihilism is a conscious nihilation of those 
values in order to establish something else. 
 Building on the theme of nihilism, chapter four addresses postmodernism 
as a form of nihilism that is specifically adapted to modernism. I see modernism 
as the dominant ideology of contemporary society, deeply attached to the larger 
framework of bourgeois thought. Within postmodernism, I find a critique of the 
values of that ideology that fit the terms and goals of nihilism, and within that 
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critique, I find the seeds of an active nihilism that can be used to present a theory 
of revolutionary praxis that breaks with the bourgeois understanding of the world. 
Active nihilism, because it is not married to the principles of the dominant ideology, 
is the lynchpin that holds together my theory of revolution as a praxis towards a 
radically different system of thought and being. 
 Finally, the fifth chapter addresses the issue of orientation towards the 
future. I contend that, because of its status as dominant in society and its relation 
to the reproduction of the conditions of domination, the bourgeois ideology is 
fundamentally present-oriented. This means that the mode of thought is focussed 
on the present and the endless reproduction of the conditions of the present, rather 
than being directed at the future. Innovation under the system becomes only 
superficial, and the fundamental social relations within the system are not subject 
to innovation. Because of this, the system makes a priority of reproducing the 
status quo; within capitalism, the logic of key phenomena such as debt rely on this 
kind of continuity. However, since revolution is meant to bring a major break away 
from the dominant conditions, I believe that adopting a revolutionary project 
requires a shift to future-orientation, in which thought is addressed to the way that 
the future provides a space of potential for praxis and the creation of something 
new. Future-orientation of this sort is a conscious response to the way that 
bourgeois thought reifies the conditions of bourgeois domination and lends ontic 
status to the relations of capitalism. Emancipation from bourgeois domination 
means actively working to negate these elements of the bourgeois ideology. In this 
13 
 
 
 
way, the final chapter connects the issue of active nihilism to the importance of 
praxis and a shift in how we understand our potential in the world.  
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I. THE BOURGEOISIE AND THEIR IDEOLOGY 
I am beginning my examination of the revolutionary potential of the future and the 
relation of nihilism to that future by discussing the form of thought that dominates 
the present. My approach is based on the fact that criticism must address what 
currently exists and how it continues to dominate. In capitalism, the bourgeoisie is 
the class that owns the means of production and therefore controls the relationship 
of production (Marx and Engels 2002). That is to say, the bourgeoisie is the 
dominant class of the capitalist social formation. With this in mind, this chapter 
will examine and explain the bourgeois ideology and the philosophy that first gave 
rise to it. Responding to the idealist and universalist origins of this school of 
thought, I will offer a countering framework that tends instead to the materialist 
and historicist mode of thinking. Rejecting the universalist and abstract style of the 
bourgeoisie is central in moving towards a theory that is focussed on the 
development of revolutionary praxis, and equally useful is offering a model of the 
bourgeoisie that focusses on their historical role as a revolutionary and praxic class. 
Because it is so vital to understanding bourgeois domination, understanding and 
attacking bourgeois ideology is the best starting point for moving towards the 
development of an alternative position, and will also ground my later examination 
of nihilism and its potential to do this. 
In modern capitalism, the bourgeoisie (in the Marxist sense) exists as the 
dominant class, and the ideas that justify the continuation of that dominance exist 
as the ideology that naturalises and maintains the social formation. However, we 
must recognise that these arrangements are neither eternal nor absolute. 
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Recognising this allows us in turn to begin positing the style of thought that will 
allow us to oppose ourselves to this society in the search of something that realises 
our values in the world. I offer in this chapter the beginnings of that alternative 
theory, drawing on the existentialist Marxism of thinkers such as Sartre, de 
Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty. Their focus on praxis and how praxis always occurs 
in relation to others is useful because it offers a theoretical grounding in real 
existence, rather than being bound to abstract universal forms. 
 The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois ideology are both particular historical 
formations, and they became dominant only through the once-revolutionary praxis 
of the bourgeois class. As such, we must first understand how that history unfolded 
and the material conditions that led to it. We must also understand that the 
bourgeoisie, in order to maintain their social power, reject this kind of historicist 
model and appeal instead to an idealist philosophy based on the principles of 
Enlightenment thought. Emerging in the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment 
was a philosophical movement that emphasised the use of Reason and individual 
freedom, pushing back against the ideas of absolute monarchy and clericalism that 
were dominant at the time (Hamilton 1996). This mode of thought relies on 
abstract forms and appeals to the universal, suppressing the subjectivity of 
humanity to justify the apparently-eternal existence of the bourgeois social order. 
Moreover, the conversion of the once-revolutionary Enlightenment philosophy to 
the conservative bourgeois ideology offers a greater understanding of why exactly 
something different is needed, rather than simply appealing to the principles of the 
Enlightenment again. 
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 A critique of the bourgeoisie and their order is also furthered by 
understanding both of these as the results of a form of praxis that has become 
realised and turned against its original project, that is, as a part of the practico-
inert (Sartre 2004). Contemporary society no longer deals with bourgeois 
capitalism as an emerging form, but as a part of society’s given facticity. 
Connecting that facticity back to human action, rather than to simply the 
manifestation of the ideal in the real world, also allows the beginnings of the 
formulation of an alternative praxis, one that can begin to move beyond the 
bourgeois society. In this way, the ideas presented in this chapter will also serve as 
a bridge towards the critique presented in the rest of this essay. 
THE ASCENT OF THE BOURGEOISIE 
In short, the beginning of capitalist ideology – and thereby, of anti-capitalist 
thought – is the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant social class. It is the 
historical fact of bourgeois revolutions, the praxis of the bourgeoisie, that 
established capitalism as the dominant economic form. Equally important to the 
development and maintenance of the capitalist world order is the bourgeois 
philosophy of liberalism and its use of idealist principles. Although the 
Enlightenment philosophy that would eventually serve as the basis of bourgeois 
ideology and its successor capitalist realism pre-existed these revolutions and 
guided the revolutionary movements, this type of thought could only become 
hegemonic once the bourgeoisie was established as the ruling class. Exact details, 
dates, and events in the establishment of the bourgeois world order are broadly 
outside the scope of this paper, but there must be a brief discussion of the largest 
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trends that link the development of capitalism to the development of bourgeois 
development. 
 The history of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class is not coterminous with 
the history of capitalism. Capitalism existed in various forms, particularly 
characterised by the activity of merchants and traders, as far back as the sixth 
century, without dominating the sphere of production (Kocka 2016). Only with the 
expansion of capitalism to the level of world-system as markets expanded through 
colonisation did the conditions develop that made the bourgeoisie the dominant 
social class (Marx and Engels 2002). Bourgeois society, then, is not exactly the 
same as capitalism, but only a particular form that emerges within the history of 
capitalism as a result of particular material conditions and economic interactions. 
Understanding this assists with the conception of modernity and so on by placing 
a historical limit on the time frame being discussed. Historicising the bourgeoisie 
in this way is also vital to founding anti-capitalist thought – the bourgeoisie is only 
one dominant class in a long history of class conflict (Marx and Engels 2002). 
Therefore, bourgeois dominance is not a necessary or universal component of 
society. 
 Prior to the expansion of capitalism to the sphere of production, it was a 
minority trend in the economy, which was dominated by subsistence practices and 
artisanal production (Kocka 2016). In this mercantilist stage, from 1650 to 1755, 
capital was largely controlled and manipulated by merchants, and the labour 
relation had not yet been commodified (Albritton 1986). Some wage labour and 
capitalist production existed, especially in mining and cottage industry (Kocka 
2016), but the bourgeois class associated with modern capitalism is characterised 
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primarily by its control of production and widespread employment of wage labour 
(Marx and Engels 2002). The historical ascent of the bourgeoisie to power is most 
concomitant with the liberal phase of capitalism, from 1755 to 1875, which was 
dominated by industrial capital and the factory production model, as well as being 
the phase of capitalism in which the law of value was most socially dominant 
(Albritton 1986). Increasing bourgeois dominance of society and the purity of the 
expression of the law of value at this time engenders the increasing economisation 
of human relations and social forms that is associated with capitalism. It is because 
of this that liberal capitalism can be seen as the ground from which modernity 
develops. 
Before becoming the dominant class, the bourgeoisie had been in conflict 
with feudal lords and was not in control of the structure of the state, but acted as a 
revolutionary class (Marx and Engels 2002). Bourgeois dominance was 
established through such acts as the revolutions in France and the United States, 
as well as through colonialism and changes made in legal systems, not through 
debates and the free entry of workers into the capitalist mode of production. Rather 
than reason being the motor of development, this stage of capitalism had a violent, 
bloody, and even terroristic history (Marx 1976). This stage of capitalist 
development was connected to the jockeying of western European states for power 
as they developed more solid political systems and colonial empires (Marx 1976; 
Kocka 2016). Material need for the basic resources required for the massive 
economic growth of this time is what drove the European capitalists to expand 
their system and allowed the bourgeoisie to establish their political dominance. 
Conditions such as these are historically contingent and bound directly to a human 
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perspective, rather than being a manifestation of some transcendent ideal that 
guides history towards its final, most perfect form. Modelling the rise of the 
bourgeoisie in such a way is key to a critical approach to history and social theory, 
but is not part of the model the bourgeois class uses to explain itself and its history. 
Therefore, this historical materialist approach, based largely on the thought of Karl 
Marx, is to be taken as one of the most important launching points for serious anti-
capitalist thought. However, it is equally important to understand at this point that 
it is through bourgeois praxis – real and projective human activity – that the 
society of modern capitalism was established, rather than through the playing out 
of some form of metaphysical/transhistorical dialectic. 
The domination of society by the bourgeoisie is the basic relation of 
capitalist society. Understanding that the bourgeoisie is the dominant class in 
contemporary society is key to analysis of the present cultural formation. But, in 
order to properly critique this cultural formation, the bourgeoisie must be 
understood as a class that developed only as the conditions of capitalism reached 
a fairly advanced stage, and only through a real and revolutionary praxis. These 
ideas are key to breaking through the ideology that casts the bourgeoisie and their 
ideals as a universal, totally rational, and transhistorical form. Critical principles 
that reject this style of thought underlie Marxism, nihilism, and postmodernism, 
but can only be established once we begin to understand the bourgeoisie as a 
particular social form tied to a particular social organisation. Here, I am taking up 
the perspective of examining the bourgeoisie as a group of human beings with 
human interests, unified in philosophy and praxis, in order to ground the rest of 
my critique of capitalist society. 
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THE VALUES OF THE BOURGEOISIE 
In order to properly frame the task of cultural critique and to understand how the 
system is reproduced, we must examine the values of the bourgeoisie, which act as 
the backbone of the ruling philosophy of capitalism. The philosophy that 
underpins bourgeois ideology derives primarily from Enlightenment thought. 
What begins as a philosophy is converted into an ideology when the class it belongs 
to becomes dominant and the goal shifts from social change to the maintenance of 
a social order. I will explore the socio-economic changes tied to the emergence of 
bourgeois ideology in greater detail in the next chapter. Being tied to the global 
expansion of capitalism and its capture of the mode of production, this ideology 
emphasises rationality, economism, and universalism in form, and is used to 
establish a discourse and model of the human being that is abstracted away from 
actual productive activity and that emphasises empty essence over all else. Like the 
bourgeois class itself, these ideas begin as revolutionary and dynamic, but become 
moribund and regressive as they are transformed into an ideology that aims to 
maintain power, rather than establishing a new order. 
 Power is not historically maintained only through activity, but also through 
the production and reproduction of a set of ideological values. As a given class 
comes to dominate society, their ideas become the dominant ones and are then 
raised to the level of universal law to defend the social order (Marx and Engels 
1998). The intellectual style of the bourgeoisie is one that is particularly given to 
the rejection of the concrete and the modelling of universality (de Beauvoir 2012). 
Over time, the extent and particulars of bourgeois ideology have developed and 
shifted, but the system of thought as a whole can still be connected to its origins in 
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Enlightenment thought and idealism. Just as connecting bourgeois dominance to 
its origins in practical human action and social arrangements helps to break 
through the veil of transhistoricism and to found a critical response, connecting 
bourgeois thought to its origins helps to break through universalism and to guide 
critical thought. Only by understanding the underpinnings of a totalising model of 
this sort can we begin to properly develop a true alternative. 
 Enlightenment thought played a major role in codifying the values of the 
bourgeoisie in formal philosophy and in establishing the basics of the worldview 
that continues to dominate models of human activity and potential. Preceding the 
American and French revolutions, the Enlightenment came before the bourgeoisie 
fully ascended to power, but provided the groundwork for the model of a rational 
and abstract human being. Philosophers and theorists of the Enlightenment 
emphasised a universalist model based on the idea that forms arrived at by reason 
could be accessed and understood by anyone, and that scientific findings derived 
from the empirical approach could be applied to develop society into a more perfect 
state (Hamilton 1996). Specifically, the idea of Enlightenment is attached to the 
use of reason by individuals in questioning the dominant forms of thought and in 
exercising freedom of thought in life, particularly in response to the domination of 
life by organised religion (Kant 1996). Scientific method and technical knowledge 
became indispensable for the Enlightenment thinkers, and were supposed to allow 
a movement beyond systems of rule based on religion and heredity. Part of this 
approach was the development of positivism, which aimed at a model of knowledge 
that was absolute and universal, capable of integrating and predicting all things 
(Hamilton1996). Positivism was also deeply embedded in the origins of sociology, 
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as Comte (2000a) posited a series of universal stages in the development of a 
society and used this model as a defence for other aspects of his theory, rather than 
looking at the particular historical factors that affected any single society. Taking 
this tendency towards universal forms and emphasis on the exercise of reason as a 
transformational tool, it is clear that the Enlightenment was a body of thought that 
was neither historical nor materialist, and this is also a vital point in understanding 
the bourgeois philosophy that is built on it. In order to justify the system of 
bourgeois capitalism that engenders alienation and exploitation of the majority of 
the population, the philosophy must be based on a system of thought that abstracts 
away from the experience and understanding of individuals. This is attached to a 
belief in a universal form of human nature (Hamilton 1996), in the style that Marx 
(1978b) would later reject as offering only a superficial, rather than a substantive, 
unity to human beings and their actions.  
In the capitalist system controlled by the bourgeoisie, this unifying principle 
of human essence is economic rationality. Over time, the meaning of work has 
shifted, with work under capitalism becoming the ground of the work ethic and 
attached to a semi-metaphysical understanding of self and one’s place in the world 
(Weber 1930). Economic rationality is a part of this transformation, referring to 
the way that people come to live and make decisions according to the logic of 
economic transactions. In this way, economic rationality represents the integration 
of the ethical and economic worlds. One aspect of this blending is the emergence 
of the model of Homo economicus, an entire structure of subjectivity that 
integrates economic reasoning, making it central to human existence (Fleming 
2017). Taking economic rationalism as the central aspect of humanity is key to the 
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bourgeois treatment of the human being and the way that the human is modelled 
in capitalist society. What is offered is a model of an objectified human being, with 
their subjectivity and capacity for negation and projection stripped away. Under 
the regime of bourgeois thought and ideology, the human being comes to be 
understood as an object for scientific reflection and technical/technological 
perfection. Perfection of this sort is tied to the larger project of social perfection 
that is inherited from the Enlightenment paradigm and which is connected to the 
value of accumulating profit and unification of production under the capitalist 
mode. Fundamentally, all human beings are here modelled on the bourgeoisie and 
their principles, and the styles of social thought, social philosophy, and social 
science that flourish under this configuration tend to reflect its underlying 
bourgeois principles, often unknowingly or unintentionally. Of course, this kind of 
reflection is one of the most fundamental elements of ideology, which places 
constructed ideas and forms above the people who constructed them and the 
actions that facilitated this construction (Marx and Engels 1998). Subordinating 
human existence to its principles is a key part of the bourgeois cultural formation 
that grows and transforms in modernity, and identifying this process is, in turn, 
central to the development of a theory that can justify and facilitate revolutionary 
action. 
 In order to allow its principles to rule over material conditions, the 
bourgeois philosophy is necessarily an idealist one. Idealism offers a framework 
that focusses on the development of spiritual forms or ideas over time, generally 
moving towards perfection. Materialism, on the other hand, examines relations in 
the world and their mediation through things like scarcity. Models that emphasise 
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perfectibility and universality, then, belong to the idealist camp; a materialist 
standpoint on human action and human essence doesn’t allow for the modelling of 
some perfect specimen it might come to align with (Horkheimer 1995). Specifically, 
Hegel’s model of absolute knowledge and the transcendent dialectic ruled German 
philosophy and were the centre of philosophical development and debate at the 
time that the bourgeoisie was developing as a class (Marx and Engels 1998; 
Nishitani 1990). In the Hegelian model, there is a movement towards the identity 
of truth and reality that is facilitated by reflection on consciousness and ideas, and 
the overall project and process of philosophy is tied directly to universality (Hegel 
1977). Combined with the proclamations of thinkers such as Kant and Descartes, 
especially their belief in the utility of reason, the form of idealism that descends 
from Hegelian thought is the cornerstone of the philosophy that was transformed 
into bourgeois ideology. A belief in the universality of Reason and a perfect form 
that exists above the actual provide the basis for the Enlightenment model of a 
perfectible society. Idealism grounds the episteme of universality and scientism 
that seeks to dominate all worldly phenomena and categorise them according to 
an absolutising and totalising logic. This begins with the reduction of human 
beings to naturalistic human essence and, over time, is extended to cover all 
elements of society and even to extend the model of society into the natural world. 
Just as with the historicity of bourgeois dominance, it is necessary to recognise 
bourgeois philosophy as universalising and idealist in order to develop a complete 
theory of modernity and revolutionary thought. 
 Not only is the existing world order raised to the level of universal law in 
idealism, but this episteme acts as the grounding for the idea that history and 
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society can be changed through debate and right-thinking, or that human beings 
can access absolute truth. This is the context for all that will follow in this paper, 
as the bourgeois society – in a form – continues to be the dominant mode. Just as 
the bourgeoisie can be examined as a product of historical events and action, 
bourgeois ideology can be examined as a product of definite philosophical trends 
and developments. I am beginning here with the ideas of the bourgeoisie because 
bourgeois dominance underlies contemporary social relations. The domination of 
society by capitalism and the conversion of bourgeois philosophy to bourgeois 
ideology provide the ground for later critical movements. Modernity, nihilism, and 
future-oriented thought can only be fully understood in the context of the 
historicised bourgeoisie and their ideology, which promotes idealist logic and 
abstract universalism. Moreover, it is only from this point, which recognises these 
particularly as historical and human forms, that the theory of revolution I propose 
here can be developed to its fullest extent. 
BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION AND PRACTICO-INERTIA 
Because of its historical role as a class with a revolutionary praxis, and because of 
the radical transformation of society under modern capitalism that came with its 
dominance, we must work to understand the way that the bourgeois revolution 
became a part of the practico-inert. Practico-inertia is a condition whereby human 
activity (i.e., praxis) results in some completed state of affairs that ends up having 
a different role than its initial purpose (Sartre 2004). I am using the concept of 
practico-inertia to explain the shift from bourgeois philosophy to bourgeois 
ideology because it allows this to be connected to the material relations and human 
projects of the bourgeoisie as a social class. Bourgeois domination of contemporary 
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society did not emerge as the result of a superhuman process, but from the 
changing social role of the bourgeois philosophy and from its shift into ideology. 
This transformation is as much a part of the history and ideology of the bourgeoise 
as the overall development of capitalism, and connects the entirety of the system 
it has developed back to human praxis. Again, this serves to further develop the 
theory of revolution in contemporary society, as it moves away from the idealist 
model of analytical critique and towards the historical-materialist model of 
revolutionary praxis. 
 Originally, the impulse of the Enlightenment and of the bourgeoisie was 
towards the institution of a freer human society. It was in this capacity that 
capitalism emerged as a response and alternative to the conditions of feudalism 
and at that time the revolutionary activity of the bourgeoisie dismantled and 
replaced many of the existing social forms and structures (Marx and Engels 2002). 
The structures that were instituted in their place can be understood, then, as a 
realised and crystallised form of bourgeois praxis which becomes the given ground 
of modern capitalism (Sartre 2004). I will examine this further in the next chapter; 
for now, all we need to know is that capitalism developed through practical activity 
on the part of the bourgeoisie and eventually shifted from being a new social form 
to the dominant social form. As bourgeois revolutionary action reached its 
economic/material goals, the system of industrial capitalism was instituted and, in 
establishing these conditions, had to shift its orientation towards maintaining the 
new social order under which it had become so powerful (Marx and Engels 2002; 
de Beauvoir 2012; Berman 1999). Initially, the shift in productive and social 
relations opened a great deal of new potential for techniques of production and the 
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reorganisation of society but, once the bourgeoisie became dominant, it had to 
begin foreclosing on those possibilities to maintain power (Berman 1999). This 
shift was concomitant with the shift from bourgeois philosophy to bourgeois 
ideology. The Enlightenment, which acted as a critique and rejection of traditional 
forms that were based more on religious discourse, has now become an antique 
form of thought and a foundation for more recent philosophy. Because a 
philosophy emerges in response to particular material conditions and social 
relations, and because the praxis that addresses those relations is also historically 
situated, once a mode of thought has become dominant and practico-inert, it no 
longer offers a way to bring revolution to the world. 
Returning to the bourgeoisie as revolutionary, the class played a key role in 
the formation of modernity, but now the conditions of modernity have developed 
further and intensified, and have shifted from being the future of humanity to 
being its facticity. When a person or a group takes on a particular project, it is 
connected to their particular interests and goals, not to some universal set of beliefs 
(de Beauvoir 2004). Therefore, the project cannot be separated from that group, 
and practico-inertia cannot be blamed on some kind of co-optation or failure – it 
is simply a question of time. Since practico-inertia does not involve a corruption or 
co-optation of a movement from outside, but a shift in a movement’s meaning after 
the project has been completed, the response to this kind of movement must not 
simply try to return to the movement’s original principles.  
Rather than believing in some overriding metaphysical form as an engine of 
social change, we must believe in the possibility of alternative praxis. For us 
contemporaries, there is a dialectic in the bourgeois revolution. Materially, the 
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processes that establish and maintain the bourgeoisie also establish and 
immiserate the proletariat (Marx 1959; Marx and Engels 2002). Rather than 
repeating the mistake of the orthodox Marxists and taking this as making 
Communism an inevitable form, we have to understand the present conditions as 
a form of facticity that enables anti-capitalist praxis. Some forms of orthodox 
Marxism have tended towards taking Marx’s critique of the operations of 
capitalism as the whole of the law, rather than being only a critique of the economic 
system of the time, and attempted to apply the law of value directly to history 
(Albritton 1986). Economic-reductionist approaches such as these move away 
from theories of praxis emerging as a result of material conditions and centred on 
intelligible human action towards semi-idealist theories of economic relations and 
class struggle that ignore the subjective and specific elements of this struggle.  
As Merleau-Ponty (1969) argues, it is necessary to establish and maintain a 
theory of the proletariat in order to pursue revolution, and this revolution must 
connect that class to concrete praxis. Proletarian praxis of this sort is dialectical 
not because it is determined by a dialectic that rules all historical forms, but 
because it will totalise and negate the existing conditions of bourgeois society in 
order to move, actively, towards the accomplishment of an alternative project 
(Sartre 2004). Practically-oriented thought is meant not just to identify 
contradictions, but also to direct praxis, and therefore must address the real 
conditions of human beings in their specific situations (Merleau-Ponty 1969). 
Activity of this sort can only be conceived of in opposition to something that was 
already done by human beings and that has become part of the historical fact of 
the situation at hand – that is, in response to the practico-inert. Theory of this type, 
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then, is opposed to the universalist and reductionist strands of orthodox Marxism 
that would posit a revolution as inevitable because of the law of value or that would 
ignore the subjective and specific conditions of the proletariat. In fact, these 
approaches ignore praxis and retreat to the utopian sphere of ideals moving 
towards perfect forms. Therefore, it is necessary to recognise bourgeois revolution 
as a previous form of praxis, which offers already a break away from the philosophy 
of absolute idealism towards the critical frameworks of historical materialism and 
nihilism. 
 Fundamentally, moving beyond bourgeois society means recognising that 
bourgeois society has lost its revolutionary aspect and turned against the 
emancipation it once promised. I have used the concept of practico-inertia here to 
demonstrate how the bourgeois philosophy has become bourgeois ideology 
through the enshrining of bourgeois social power, rather than through its 
infiltration by some perfidious other. This, too, is a necessary point of context for 
what will follow in later sections of this paper. Taking bourgeois society as an 
example of practico-inertia in contemporary society is key to the development of 
future-thinking, with a fuller understanding of the phenomenon being possible 
through understanding the emergence of postmodernity and nihilism. 
MOVING BEYOND THE BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 
At this point, the essential project of revolution is the rejection and overcoming of 
bourgeois society, and an important aspect of that is shifting our orientation 
towards future-thinking. This project is the central aspect that allows a unified 
understanding of Marxism, nihilism, and postmodernism. Bourgeois society acts 
as the framework and underpinning of the value system that all of these alternative 
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ways of thought aim to critique and escape, and capitalism is the material condition 
that must be addressed in order to develop a more complete human freedom. Even 
today, the dominant episteme is based on the same principles as the earlier 
bourgeois ideology, and so our project at this point continues to involve the 
development of an alternative mode of thought. Operating within the confines of 
this episteme, given its tendency towards absolutism and emphasis on universal 
forms, does not provide a way towards a real alternative. 
 Historicism, the perspective that human meaning and relations are 
influenced by historical conditions rather than just being expressions of a universal 
form, provides a first escape from the bourgeois system and its absoluteness. In 
attaching the bourgeoisie and its dominance to historical processes and forms, we 
negate the model of its necessity and permanence. This will be developed further 
in the examination of the conditions of modernity and postmodernity, with their 
material-economic particularities. However, examining the details of these 
formations requires first modelling their basic form. Crude and brief as it may be, 
the history of bourgeois society and bourgeois ideology I have provided here offers 
a model of that basic form, which is an idealist approach that appeals to the 
universality of reason and nature and to the use of economic rationality.  
What must be maintained from here on is the anchoring aspect of this 
history, a central point around which the rest of the investigation can move. 
Centring and contextualising the investigation also makes the goal of the entire 
project clearer; rather than trying to appeal to a universal form of thought, the 
project can be recognised as a response to something that already exists in the 
world, with the end of negating that existence in order to affirm something better. 
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Understanding history, both in terms of events and causes and as a product 
of human praxis rather than an unfolding of metaphysics or providence, grounds 
our work in real conditions and relations. Attaching this history to materiality and 
action is key to escaping the bourgeois model of history as the movement of ideas 
and spirits. As we establish a goal for the future in terms of what exists already, we 
can establish our methods with reference to human action. Idealism falls short in 
this aspect, as the idealist must believe in the autonomous movement and 
development of ideas in the world; in this model, the human being and their 
activity only play a mediating role, instead of a determinant one. Materialism, on 
the other hand, connects us as human beings directly to changes in the world and 
in the social formation (Horkheimer 1995; Marx 1978b). Moreover, materialism 
offers a break from the bourgeois ideology and a way to be vigilant in our thought 
so as to avoid reification of forms and reproduction of the very system we seek to 
oppose (Horkheimer 1975). Critique must be oriented, after all, at the creation of 
something new, rather than just a renovation of what is (Marx 1978b). Radicality 
is necessary if one seeks to change the world, and against the absolute idealism of 
the bourgeoisie, proper materialist thought offers a radically different perspective 
that can guide us going forward. 
Comprehending the bourgeoisie and their history as the basis of the 
contemporary society provides the grossest context of the project of changing that 
form for one that engenders a greater human freedom. Setting the bourgeoisie as 
the dominant class and their rise to that status in this particular way is the 
necessary beginning of our project and sets before us the space to more fully 
apprehend the solution to our problem. 
32 
 
 
 
INTEGRATION 
In this first chapter, I have provided an outline of the bourgeois philosophy and 
ideology, and its relation to idealism and universalism. To me, these are key 
aspects for the development of further critique. Because of the dominating position 
and actions of the bourgeoisie, their worldview provides the context and grounding 
for opposing positions. Therefore, it is only by understanding bourgeois ideology 
as a practico-inert form of a previously revolutionary philosophy that we can begin 
to move outside of their theory and the circumscriptions it puts on action to 
properly understand what else is possible and to begin to move towards a new 
world. 
 Central to my understanding and critique of the social order is the model of 
the bourgeoisie as a class that has become dominant through their praxis and the 
conversion of revolutionary bourgeois philosophy to practico-inert bourgeois 
ideology. This is related to the changing role of capitalism in society and how its 
relation to the state and the larger body politic has shifted over time. In the next 
chapter, I will connect the bourgeois philosophy I described here to the concrete 
historical shifts of capitalism and how those shifts gave rise to the condition of 
modernity and, eventually, postmodernity. This, too, is necessary to 
understanding the role and potential of critique. Proper materialism and 
historicism demand that attention be paid to the relation of the ideology to the 
material conditions, and that can only be accomplished by moving now from what 
the ideology is to its relation to those material conditions. 
 Linking the bourgeois ideology to universalism and idealism is also central 
to this essay. These twin concepts provide a serious ideological tool for the 
33 
 
 
 
bourgeoisie, allowing their ideology to be presented as value-free and non-
historical. I will revisit this later in dealing with nihilism, which presents 
alternative epistemological and ontological claims and allows us to move back 
towards the concrete and this-worldly aspects of existence. All of what I am 
presenting here can be understood as a response to, and a rejection of, bourgeois 
thought, and from the starting point of this chapter, the proper importance and 
explanation of those concepts can be developed. 
 The domination of society by the bourgeoisie is the fundamental driver of 
contemporary social relations and the need for the development of an alternative 
theory. Starting from the logic of bourgeois thought and deconstructing it to show 
the praxis and history underlying this system allows the construction of an 
alternative theory. However, before I move to outlining the principles of that 
alternative, I will first examine the concrete history of capitalism’s relation to the 
state in order to explain how the social order has been transformed to more 
thoroughly ensure bourgeois domination.  
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II. (POST)MODERNITY 
Here, I turn to examining the relation between capitalism and the state. In order 
to maintain a materialist perspective, I must trace the shifts in how material 
conditions and relations have been organised over time. The bourgeoisie 
established their dominance over time through changing this relation, and 
bourgeois praxis was aimed towards getting those changes made in order to shore 
up power. My first contention here, then, is that the relationship between 
capitalism and the state has changed over time and that this change served to 
enshrine the bourgeoisie as the dominant class. Further, as the influence of 
capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie grew, their goal gradually shifted away 
from making changes to defending the new power order. By explaining how and 
why this shift occurred, I aim to deepen the model of capitalism as an object of 
practico-inertia and the bourgeoisie as a class that shifted from revolutionary to 
conservative. Finally, I will offer an account of how, because of the challenges that 
capitalism faced once it had become dominant – particularly in the twentieth 
century – the main style of economic organisation continued to be renovated and 
why it is important to address this particular form when examining contemporary 
society and theory. 
Modernity is a key concept in the historical and political development of 
capitalism and the development of bourgeois dominance. For the purposes of this 
essay, modernity is to be considered the period in which capitalism was first 
established as dominant. During modernity, capitalism shifts in character from 
being on the sidelines to being the central method of economic organisation. 
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Moreover, the relationship between capitalism and the state is inverted: initially, 
under feudalism, capitalism was opposed by the government; by the latest stages 
of modernity, the state had become fully a tool of capitalism and a necessary 
instrument for the maintenance of the capitalist system as a whole. More than 
anything, the period of modernity is the period in which the bourgeoisie fully 
enshrined their domination. Because of the fundamental change in the relation of 
capitalism to the state, as well as the shift in the role of the bourgeoisie from 
revolutionary to conservative, and because of the major systematic changes in how 
capitalism operates and maintains itself, I contend that we can consider the 
contemporary period to be one of postmodernity, one in which the project of 
modernity has been completed. 
 Over time, capitalism has changed from a system that was highly dynamic 
and innovative to one that has become metastable and conservative. While there 
are still some aspects of innovation in contemporary capitalism, they have become 
superficial. Initially, capitalism was replacing the dominant system of guild 
production, which entailed massive social change; today, however, innovation is 
more in the form of incremental improvements on the fundamental techniques 
employed for production. This process mirrors the shift in the historical role of the 
bourgeoisie from revolutionary to reactionary class. Processes of internal conflict 
within capitalism, as well as encounters of the system with forces outside of its 
control, led to this shift. By understanding the events and effects of modernity, we 
can more fully understand contemporary capitalism’s origins and begin to move 
towards a critique and overcoming of the system. 
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 Modelling modernity as a period of change and eventual sclerosis also 
allows us to begin to understand the process of moving beyond the system, 
beginning with the recognition of postmodernity. Postmodernity has emerged, 
dialectically, through the changes in capitalism’s internal dynamics and relations 
to the larger social structure. Rather than an entirely new period, radically divorced 
from modernity, however, we must understand postmodernity as something that 
is attached to modernity dialectically. Grasping the relation of the two in this way 
represents for us the beginning of a theory that can move us beyond this relation. 
THE CHARACTER OF MODERNITY 
Modernity is the period of human history in which capitalism becomes the 
dominant mode of economic organisation and, at the same time, the bourgeoisie 
becomes the hegemonic social class. In other words, modernity is the period in 
which the material bases of capitalism become firmly established; the condition of 
modernity, by extension, is the existence of these material and social conditions. 
This period begins in the 19th century with the emergence and ascendance of 
industrial capitalism as well as the changes in lifestyle and labour practices that 
are associated with this economic form. Everyday life and the political order have 
both been restructured as a result of the processes of early industrialisation and 
modernisation, and this type of social dynamism in the pursuit of ensuring the 
metastability of the system is a central feature of modernity. Just as the bourgeoisie 
has changed its historical role from being a revolutionary to a reactionary class, 
and as bourgeois philosophy has become ossified in the form of ideology, so has 
modernity changed over time from being a radically new socioeconomic relation 
to being one that has been institutionally codified and calcified. 
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 Key to modernity is the establishment of capitalism as the dominant form 
of economic activity and its concomitant enshrining in law. No economy develops 
separate from polity, and legality is a key mechanism in ensuring the stability of a 
system. Particularly important to the development of modern capitalism was the 
process of enclosure, the legal transformation of land that had been held 
collectively into private property (Kocka 2016; Marx 1976). Private property is a 
fundamental aspect of both political economy and its bastard offspring, economic 
physics, but it is not guaranteed through natural law, only through the juridico-
legal system (Marx 1976). As much as it is the period in which the capitalist 
economy fully developed, modernity is the period in which the capitalist state 
emerged. 
 Early modernity was a period of particular dynamism within capitalism, as 
both the industrial system and the living arrangements of workers had to be 
overhauled to establish the new order as hegemonic. Industrial capitalism at this 
time was characterised by rapid innovation in technology and the structure of 
enterprise, as well as the centralisation of production in urban factories (Kocka 
2016). Urbanisation and technological innovation were key to the shoring up of 
bourgeois control of the means of production, as it represented a break from the 
prior, more rural, relations of feudalism and control of production by guilds (Marx 
1976). In this nascent form, modernity was characterised by a rapid change in the 
social formation, and previously-established values and traditions lost their 
reliability (Marx and Engels 2002). Innovation and dynamism were not, however, 
pursued as their own end or as part of a program for the betterment of humanity, 
but only as a result of the failure of older forms of technology to match the growth 
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that the principles of the capitalist economy demanded (Albritton 1986). With this 
in mind, we can understand the dynamic character of industrial capitalism and the 
society of early modernity as being ultimately directed towards the establishment 
of a stable economy and society. 
 However, though modernity was directed towards stability, this stability 
must be understood as the stability of the system, not the stability of the 
individual’s way of life or even the economic and stability of the individual’s status. 
For workers, the transition to capitalism brought increasing precarity, especially 
in terms of the necessities of life (Marx 1959). For capitalists, the drive to increase 
profit and grow capital necessitated competition between firms, and this 
competition could only become fiercer as the number of firms shrank (Marx 1959; 
Marx 1976). Capitalism, unlike feudalism before it, does not rely on the logic of an 
absolute social hierarchy derived from divine right. Instead, the principles and 
behaviours of markets are meant to be the driving force behind social stratification, 
and there is no market force present that guarantees one class (im)mobility. In fact, 
the ability to move between social classes can be understood as part of the 
alienation of labour under capitalism, and the metastability of the capitalist system 
can be understood as an effect of the abstraction that causes this alienation. 
Workers become alienated as they must subordinate themselves and their 
subjectivity to the logic of capital in order to secure the necessities of life, while 
capitalists become alienated as they must subordinate themselves and their 
subjectivity to the logic of pursuit of profit (Marx 1959). Both worker and owner 
are reduced to an abstract form and only exist as objects of market logic, cogs in 
the machine of profit production. Each individual cog, however, is a replaceable 
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part, and the class hierarchy that follows from unequal control of the means of 
production is one that is derived practically and extemporaneously, not through 
the movement of a metaphysical principle in the way that royalty supposedly was.  
Metastability, the condition of a system that remains in place even as its 
internal parts and techniques are renovated over time, is key to understanding the 
model of capitalism I am advancing, both in terms of its economic base and its 
ideological superstructure; moreover, it is key to understanding the trajectory of 
modernity and the eventual emergence of postmodernity. Due to its internal logical, 
capitalism can only be maintained over time as a metastable system. In a stable 
system, competing forces and conflicting elements are balanced and managed to 
keep any one aspect from overbalancing the rest, which would cause collapse. 
These aspects of balance and maintenance are here built in to the system, so 
stability is an aspect that emerges from the particularities of the system’s design. 
For example, a computer could be considered a stable system, using heatsinks and 
fans to manage the waste heat produced by operation that could eventually 
threaten the integrity of the components. Naturally, this is not to say that a stable 
system is an immortal one – the removal of the computer’s power or the failure of 
a component can prevent operation – but that the system is not self-destructive by 
design. On the other hand, metastability is a stability that is enforced from without. 
Here, conflicts and dynamics are not properly balanced and managed as a part of 
the system’s design, and there is a threat – even a likelihood – of collapse. Because 
of the fundamental imbalances in the system, management must come from 
outside intervention. One instance of this might be a bonfire: this is a system that, 
by its fundamental operation, destroys itself: as the logs burn, they can no longer 
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offer fuel to the fire, and somebody has to add more wood. In the case of capitalism, 
this means state intervention in the economy to ensure that it continues to exist 
and operate even when conditions are not amenable. Understanding metastability 
as part of contemporary capitalism also helps us to move away from an idealist 
perspective and towards a materialist one by incorporating the idea of the 
bourgeoisie as a class that is still responding to threats to their power, still using 
praxis to maintain their social dominance, rather than reducing them to the simple 
object of a universal process. 
 Capitalism demands metastability as a result of class conflict. Over time, 
competition logically leads to the concentration of wealth in fewer hands and, 
therefore, leads to the immiseration of a growing segment of society (Marx 1959). 
Allowed to develop unchecked and without response from the dominant 
bourgeoisie, this immiserated class, the proletariat, could come to develop a 
consciousness of their conditions and could take on a revolutionary character 
(Marx and Engels 2002). As such, part of the maintenance of capitalist society is 
always to keep this class conflict from boiling over. In modernity, this is a central 
problem for the bourgeoisie and is addressed historically through material, legal, 
and ideological techniques. Production of an immiserated class is, however, 
unavoidable under capitalism, and has never been of particular importance to the 
bourgeois power elite. Instead, it is management of class tension and the 
prevention of the formation of revolutionary class consciousness that has been 
prioritised. Class conflict, then, is part of the metastability of the system, which is 
particularly clear in its treatment by capitalist ideology, which I will examine in a 
later section of this paper. 
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 We can best understand modernity as the period of capitalist hegemony’s 
emergence and solidification. Capitalism develops more fully and becomes 
dominant during modernity. However, modernity still comprises several forms of 
capital and a long period of development and reformation in response to historical 
events. In order to more completely understand modernity, and in order to 
properly conceptualise postmodernity, then, we must now turn our attention to 
some of the key events of the twentieth century and their effects on the social 
formation. 
TURNING POINTS IN MODERNITY 
Broadly speaking, there are five major historical events in the twentieth century 
that affected the development of modern capitalism and demanded systemic 
rearrangement. These events are: the two World Wars, the Great Depression, and 
the emergence and fall of the Soviet Union. While I recognise that this grouping 
does not strictly reflect the timeline of these events, it does reflect their logical 
connections and makes it easier to manage the discussion. Each of these events 
brought the modern capitalist system into an unavoidable conflict that entailed a 
rearrangement of elements of the system that, while maintaining the larger 
metastable framework, changed the conditions of life and political-economic 
development. In the grand scheme of things, these turning points also laid the 
groundwork for postmodernity, the period in which the organisation of the state 
has become fully subordinated to the maintenance of the capitalist system. 
 Unprecedented in scale and death toll, the two World Wars necessitated a 
change in the organisation of European states to avoid repetition. Broadly, this 
meant a de-purification of capitalism, a move away from allowing market logic to 
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operate as freely as it had, as state intervention became a necessary aspect of the 
economy (Albritton 1986). States moving away from more laissez-faire 
approaches to capitalism is an important point of context for understanding the 
development of later stages of modernity, where attempts at a type of re-
purification through turning to neoliberal policy emerged. During the interwar 
years, attempts were made to stabilise the European economy and to return to the 
organisation that had been present before the First World War, but these attempts 
failed; consequently, the world economy entered the Great Depression, which led 
in turn to the emergence of fascism and the Second World War (Albritton 1986). 
 The Great Depression stood, and still stands today, as the most powerful 
demonstration of capitalist economic crisis. It was a time of widespread poverty 
and economic uncertainty, upending the arrangements that were becoming more 
and more stable in the capitalist world. Effects of this crisis, however, were not 
limited just to the economic, but spread out into the larger situation of social life, 
and the upheaval and precarity that existed at this time would eventually lead to 
the emergence of fascism in Europe, which led directly to the Second World War. 
Moreover, preventing another depression of this scale became a priority for world 
leaders, necessitating a shift in the dominant economic policy. In this way, 
responding to the Great Depression and managing the systemic aspects that 
initially caused it became part of capitalist metastability.  
Efforts following the First World War, with the creation of the League of 
Nations and measures in the Treaty of Versailles, failed to prevent the Second 
World War, which was even more deadly and ended with the introduction of the 
atomic bomb, which acted as the crux of the Cold War arms race between the 
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United States and the Soviet Union. To avoid the possibility of a Third World War 
or a second Great Depression, leaders in western Europe worked to establish a new 
world order, through the institution of the Bretton Woods system of monetary 
management and the establishment of supranational organisations like the World 
Bank and IMF (Harvey 2005). International organisations such as these represent 
a shift towards a more global order of capitalism, one of the key features of the later 
stages of modernity and the contemporary period of postmodernity. Because these 
systems were attached directly to the use of the United States dollar as a reserve 
currency and the protection of the United States military, they also represent the 
establishment of the United States as the key superpower of the modern capitalist 
world system (Harvey 2005; Albritton 1986). Accompanying this development, 
there was a shift in economic policy from the earlier form of liberalism to 
Keynesianism, which embedded the liberal aspects of the economy in a framework 
of political regulations in an attempt to avoid the worst of capitalism’s tendency 
towards crisis (Harvey 2005). Keynesianism becoming dominant was key to the 
de-purification of capitalism, as it shifted the liberal state into a more 
interventionist mode, which was seen as necessary to maintaining the 
metastability of markets. Even today, this type of state necessity is maintained in 
capitalist economics, and it is another key feature of modernity in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. 
 Outside of western Europe, concomitant with the end of the First World 
War, was the Russian Revolution of 1917, which established the Soviet Union. Just 
as the World Wars and Great Depression had, the creation of this new state 
demanded an economic response from the capitalist world. Soviet Russia and the 
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other nations within its sphere of influence represented a direct economic threat 
to the hegemony of capitalism and the power order of the West, and the relation of 
East and West was characterised by the tensions of the Cold War. It was in this 
context that the final seeds of postmodernity would be sown, as specific elements 
of the contemporary capitalist ideology developed in response to the suddenly-
realistic threat of Communism in the world. Most importantly, though, while the 
Soviet Union existed, it showed that a non-capitalist state was possible, moving the 
concept outside of the realm of pure theory. Revolutionary praxis, embodied in the 
Eastern bloc, was more at hand than ever before, and capitalism faced its greatest 
threat from outside. 
 1991, though, brought with it the final collapse of the Soviet Union and 
capitalism’s greatest victory. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the last major 
event in the development of modernity and cemented the status of capitalism as 
world hegemon (Fukuyama 1989). However, it should be noted that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union did not happen simply as a result of capitalism’s superior 
ideology or organisation, but in the context of a protracted economic and political 
Cold War. Communism’s collapse was also a result of bourgeois praxis and the 
conflict between different, incompatible, projects. It is this shoring up of capitalist 
power that represents the fullest development of modernity and the transition to 
postmodernity, as it brings with it the final ideological development of capitalist 
thought. Revolution, with the demise of the Soviet Union, was dealt a serious blow. 
Having an actual Communist superpower in the world was an animating force for 
anti-capitalism, and offered a central point for the organisation of anti-capitalist 
movements. Lacking such a lodestar in the contemporary period, revolution is put 
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into question and, because of its association with the démodé politics of the Soviet 
Union, communist thought faced a serious threat in the twentieth century. Post-
Soviet capitalism takes as a fundamental assumption that there is no viable 
alternative model (Fisher 2009). Part of postmodernity, then, is the fact of 
existence in the post-Communist world and how revolutionary thought can be 
rehabilitated after such a crippling defeat. 
 Modernity is the period in which capitalism has most fully developed, and 
a central part of understanding that development is situating it with regards to the 
most important world-historical events of the times. In the twentieth century, the 
capitalist world system faced major existential crises, and the reorganisations that 
resulted were central in the establishment of the contemporary economic order. 
Understanding the transformations of modernity and the shift from innovation to 
preservation of the system, and tying these shifts to specific turning points in 
history, allows us to contextualise and comprehend the emergence of the particular 
form of capitalism that exists in the contemporary period of postmodernity. This 
brings us to the next topic, neoliberalism, as it represents the form of capitalism 
that was developed through these responses. 
NEOLIBERALISM 
Neoliberalism is a form of capitalism that emerged in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century and today stands as the dominant form, playing a central role in 
the order of postmodernity. Historically, neoliberalism was formulated as a 
response to the crises of capitalism and to the existence of Soviet Communism, and 
represents the end of the project of the modern bourgeoisie as the state is 
converted fully from obstacle to ensurer of capitalism. Ideologically, it is meant to 
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be a return to laissez-faire capitalism, but it must be understood that neoliberalism 
is only quasi-capitalistic, as it relies on a particular state formation that is 
necessary to ensure the existence of markets and the participation of the 
population in the market economy. Materially, neoliberalism brings with it a 
particular organisation of society and labour that departs from the industrial 
capitalism of early modernity and further destabilises the worker’s lifestyle. 
Ultimately, it is the introduction and codification of neoliberal principles in the 
economic organisation of social life that heralds the fullest transition from 
modernity to postmodernity. 
 Following the Second World War, there was a turn towards Keynesian 
economics and the restriction of markets by state intervention to limit crisis. 
However, in the middle of the twentieth century, economic growth was slowing 
down and the distribution of wealth was beginning to shift away from the top of 
society; neoliberalism was developed as a response to these conditions, aimed at a 
return to the accumulation and concentration of capital (Harvey 2005). To this end, 
neoliberal policy is a conscious attempt to return to the laissez-faire style of 
governance that characterised pre-Second World War Europe and America. At the 
same time, though, neoliberal theory and policy understands that the state is 
necessary to preserve the existence of the market and to coerce people into market 
participation, and the economy is built on a foundation of legal codification of 
property rights and state intervention to prop up flagging markets (Harvey 2005). 
In early modernity, feudal governments were antagonistic to capitalism and 
prevented its infiltration into the relations of production. In high modernity, 
social-democratic governments used a Keynesian approach to mitigate the worst 
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crisis tendencies of capitalism, strictly regulating markets. In postmodernity, the 
neoliberal state is transformed into an instrument of capitalism, acting to 
guarantee the stability of the market form, even while competition and 
concentration of wealth immiserate an ever-growing segment of the population. 
That is to say, the state now acts to guarantee the existence of capitalism and the 
metastability of the system. Assurance of this type was most clearly visible in the 
government response to the financial crisis of 2008, when governments stepped in 
to save institutions that had been deemed “too big to fail” (Kocka 2016). This 
designation did not mean that those institutions held too much capital or power to 
be prone to failure, but that they were so integral to the system that the government 
could not allow them to fail, as the disruption would be too great to recover from. 
Metastability of this sort is a serious impediment for revolutionary action, and is 
both baked into the political structure of neoliberal capitalism as well as into the 
ideological superstructure. 
 How labour is structured has also shifted since the institution of the 
neoliberal order. Before the 1960s, labour was mostly organised according to the 
principles of Fordism within the Keynesian framework, and this created a fairly 
stable configuration under which material conditions were improving (Harvey 
1989). In the 60s and 70s, though, growth had slowed and the rigidity of this 
economic form began to act as an impediment to capitalist accumulation (Harvey 
1989; Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism was brought in as a response, a return to the 
(nominal) self-regulation of markets as the Keynesian approach failed to produce 
a viable response to the economic crisis (Harvey 1989; Kocka 2016). While 
Fordism-Keynesianism was very rigid and tended towards a system of more total 
48 
 
 
 
management of life, the new order of neoliberalism is characterised by an emphasis 
on flexibility in the economy (Harvey 1989). Flexibility of this sort – limited 
flexibility on the part of the worker, always constrained by the politically-ensured 
limits of the market – characterises labour in postmodernity. Capitalism’s 
tendency towards accumulation, stratification, and immiseration is revitalised by 
the neoliberal shift away from Keynesianism’s class compromise but, particularly 
when combined with the ideological elements of the culture, revolutionary praxis 
is made to seem impossible due to the structural intervention of the state to 
maintain the overall structure. In this way, metastability of the system also affects 
labour: for the worker, precarity and loss of wealth are normal, but the crisis 
tendency is mitigated for the shrinking number of capitalists. 
 In addition to the increasing flexibility demanded of labourers, neoliberal 
capitalism is characterised by a shift in focus from production to finance. Just as 
industrial capital was the primary form in the liberal period, financial capital is the 
dominant form in the neoliberal period (Albritton 1986; Kocka 2016). Expansion 
of financial capitalism into more segments of the economy has been accompanied 
by a change in the measure of value; today, rather than production being the main 
indicator of an economy’s strength, it is the value of the stock market (Harvey 
2005). Growth in value has also been facilitated by the divorce of currency from 
the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, which allows more play in 
currency markets and an expansion of the financial sector (Kocka 2016). 
Separating value and production is a key innovation in the neoliberal system and 
its metastability. When value is tied to production directly, even small changes in 
production can have pronounced effects, and the workers who actually do the 
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producing gain a great deal of direct power over the economy. Neither of these 
conditions is favourable to the capitalist, who wants to ensure growth and avoid 
threats to their power and status. Divorcing value from production and moving it 
to financial performance, combined with the move of currency production under 
the aegis of the state, sidesteps these aspects, further concentrating the power of 
the bourgeoisie and, by extension, mitigating the potential for revolutionary action 
by helping to strengthen the metastability of the overall system. 
 Today, the logic of neoliberalism has become hegemonic globally, and social 
life has taken on a deeply neoliberal character. The system is maintained by both 
material intervention by the state, through practices of qualitative easing and the 
rigorous protection of property in law, as well as through the ideological 
superstructure. Overall, neoliberalism is key to the establishing of capitalism as a 
metastable and totalising system, and this deeply curtails the revolutionary 
possibility. With the history of modernity and the character of neoliberalism in 
mind, we can turn our attention to understanding the condition of postmodernity, 
how it relates to modernity, and what it means for revolution. 
POSTMODERNITY 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the form of capitalism and its 
relation to the state have changed. This process was part of the development of 
bourgeois hegemony and the subsumption of the state by capitalist logic. As these 
changes went on, the organisation of social life and the potential for revolutionary 
praxis have changed, and understanding these changes is crucial for having a 
proper sociology of contemporary life. The totality of these changes is the shift 
from modernity, a period characterised by the growth of capitalism and its 
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assumption of ever-greater power, to postmodernity, a period in which capitalism 
has become much more fully integrated into the social fabric and has shifted into 
a mode of metastability. In postmodernity, the capitalist system is much more 
complete and dominant, and changes in the structure of power have made 
revolution a more complicated prospect, but one that also has a far more radical 
character. 
 There is some dispute about whether postmodernity is a useful concept in 
understanding capitalism and, if it is useful, when exactly the period of 
postmodernity begins. I will say here that postmodernity, as a period that follows 
the completion of modernity’s developing and entrenching of capitalism, is useful 
in understanding the development of capitalism because it allows us to fully model 
the change in capitalism from the early period of modernity, when it was dynamic 
and opposed to the traditional and entrenched social and political order, to the 
contemporary, when capitalism has become hegemonic in the organisation of 
economic activity. In itself, this shift in relations between the body politic and the 
economic is of great sociological importance, as it demonstrates an increasing 
integration of the two spheres, which cannot be ignored if we want to understand 
the position of people as social subjects or the construction of the self through 
social means. From a theoretical perspective, it also leads to shifts in epistemology 
and ontology as the capitalist ideology becomes more and more dominant and 
naturalised as common sense over time. Modernity, broadly, is the period in which 
these changes are going on; postmodernity is the period in which they have 
happened and in which we can begin to understand those changes. Accepting this 
transition is especially important if we are to pursue a dialectical analysis of history. 
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Dialectical understanding, after all, can only be fully developed in terms of a form 
that has been completely developed and, therefore, can only be used to analyse a 
historical formation; formations of the present and of the future are outside of 
dialectical reason (Sartre 2004; Kierkegaard 1996). Taking on the perspective of 
postmodernity allows us to formulate something that breaks, at least partially, 
from modernity, in order to understand the dialectic of modernity and use that 
standpoint to begin to develop a way forward, a theory of future-thinking and 
revolutionary praxis. 
 At the same time, we have to understand the limit of the perspective of 
postmodernity. Namely, that postmodernity is not entirely separate from 
modernity. Giddens (1990) argues that, rather than postmodernity proper, what 
has emerged is a particularly intense and mature configuration of modernity, 
which we better understand. However, this intensification and maturation is the 
exact condition by which modernity passes into postmodernity. The dialectics at 
play in capitalism’s development during modernity – between the capitalist and 
the worker, between capitalism and the state, between the West and the East – 
have led to the peculiar formation of neoliberalism, with its tendency towards 
metastability, and towards the apparent demise of Communism. Sticking to 
modernity prevents us from seeing this dialectical development, as it keeps us from 
being able to recognise the completion of the dialectical process. Just as the 
bourgeoisie passes from revolutionary to reactionary through its praxis becoming 
practico-inert, so does modernity pass towards postmodernity as the capitalist 
system passes from minority formation to hegemon. 
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 That being said, modernity and postmodernity are not entirely separate. 
Instead, we can recognise postmodernity as something of a transitional stage in 
the overall development of capitalism. This transition is characterised as a move 
away from pure capitalism and the absolute dominance of the law of value to a 
system in which the state is subordinated to markets and in which intervention is 
recognised as necessary to maintain the system; capitalism is impure, but there is 
not yet a movement towards communism in the Marxist sense (Albritton 1986). 
Dialectically, the relation of modernity and postmodernity is transitional; 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) describes a transitional dialectic in terms of the past, 
present, and future, as one in which the synthesis of the different terms does not 
allow identification, but differentiation and a living-through of a change. The 
dialectic of modernity is not absolutely complete, but we can recognise 
postmodernity as the second term in the triad – the negation – and we can take 
this as our grounding in a search for the third, the negation of the negation. 
Examining the political-economic formation of postmodernity, however, 
highlights the necessity of understanding a shift in revolutionary praxis that 
mirrors the shift in the character of the overall system. Old forms of consciousness 
and praxis, being attached to old forms of political economy, cannot simply be 
substituted into the new condition. Instead, we must now develop a new style of 
revolution. To do this, however, we must turn our attention to the ideological 
superstructure of postmodernity and to the critique that allows the breakdown of 
its fundamental values. 
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INTEGRATION 
This chapter has continued on from the previous, but with a more direct eye 
towards how the bourgeoisie entrenched their dominance through shifting the 
place of capitalism in the social order. I have laid out the way that capitalism has 
moved from an alternative to feudalism and become not only the central mode of 
economic organisation but also made superordinate to the other functions of the 
state. All of this is meant to develop the material aspect of what was presented in 
the first chapter, the transformation of Enlightenment philosophy to bourgeois 
ideology. In the concrete sphere, this has meant the creation of the metastable 
order of neoliberal capitalism. 
 While the first chapter offered an explanation of the fundamental aspects of 
bourgeois ideology, the historical and material approach I took in this chapter is 
meant to pinpoint specific instances and goals of bourgeois praxis since the 
emergence of capitalism. In so doing, I have shown how the ideological 
superstructure is linked to, and develops out of, the material base. By explaining 
how capitalism has developed and ossified over time, I have outlined the specific 
events and goals involved in the transformation of the bourgeoisie from 
revolutionary to counter-revolutionary class. 
 More than anything, these first two chapters have been meant to provide 
context for what will follow. Now, we have a model of the bourgeoisie and of 
capitalism that will give ground as I turn my attention to the development of 
critique. This ground is found in the fundamental assumptions of the bourgeois 
ideology and their connection to practical goals in the development of capitalism 
through the period of modernity. My critique is also grounded in the period of 
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postmodernity and the neoliberal style of capitalism, since those are the time and 
the condition in which I live. Because of this, I cannot offer a critique of the system 
from any other standpoint, and so the context is inseparable from my theoretical 
project. 
 In the next chapter, I will turn my attention to nihilism as a tool of critique 
that is meant to break down and break through the fundamental aspects of the 
dominant mode of thought. Nihilism, like all other aspects of this essay, develops 
as a specific response to bourgeois ideology and praxis. It also provides a 
grounding for the concept of postmodernism, a specific response to the specific 
bourgeois concept of modernism. To this end, I will be using nihilism as the 
launching point of my critique. 
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III. ON NIHILISM 
As an economic arrangement related to and defended by the political form, 
capitalism is justified and explained by the bourgeois philosophy that follows from 
Enlightenment thought. Because of this, to work towards a revolution that would 
change our social form, we must understand that another philosophy is possible. 
Nihilism, a philosophy that shows the values of the dominant form of thought to 
be hollow, baseless, and human, is extremely useful to this end. I contend that the 
development of a proper, active nihilism can lead us towards a philosophy and 
theory that engenders revolutionary action against a dominant system. However, 
because the rejection of the value of universalism is so central to the nihilist 
approach, the accusation will be made that nihilism cannot lead to any kind of 
substitute system being created. To respond to this accusation, we must 
understand that both passive and active forms of nihilism exist. The passive form 
does, indeed, stop at rejection; but the active form is an affirmational approach 
that takes on the project of creating a new set of values that is not based on those 
rejected principles, but on real human activity (Nietzsche 1968). I find that active 
nihilism exists in a dialectical relationship with the passive form, and with the 
dominant philosophy: one must pass through the dominant style to reach passive 
nihilism as its negation, then through passive nihilism to active nihilism as a 
negation of that negation. Understanding this allows us to more fully develop a set 
of principles that escapes bourgeois thought. In this chapter, I will explain how 
nihilism emerges as a critique of the assumptions of the Enlightenment philosophy 
that underpins bourgeois thought and how, through the development of that 
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critique, we can move from simple rejection towards a revolutionary form of 
thought that is radically different and focusses on the potential for change in the 
future. 
 In keeping with the other principles of this essay, I will show that nihilism 
can be understood as a form of immanent critique of bourgeois thought. Pursuing 
the principles of this worldview to their logical conclusion, nihilism shows how 
these ideas undercut themselves and remove their own grounding (Nishitani 1990). 
From the standpoint of nihilism, the assumptions of positivist and universalist 
approaches rely on the acceptance of articles of faith, rather than an understanding 
of human works and projects. Active nihilism goes further than this, encouraging 
people to engage with their role in the (re)production and maintenance of 
knowledge and to own the fact that their own power and projects are implied in 
the knowledge they possess. Because of this, I see active nihilism as a bridge 
towards a mode of thought that more deeply acknowledges praxis and, therefore, 
one that encourages further praxis.  
 Nihilism is also the attached to the later critique of postmodernism. As such, 
understanding nihilism will also help us to understand postmodernism more fully. 
Just as postmodernity emerged from the conditions and trends of modernity, we 
will see that postmodernism emerged as a response to modernism. 
Postmodernism also emerged as a result of specific changes in the organisation of 
capitalism, and so reconfigures nihilism for the contemporary situation. Full 
comprehension of nihilism prevents us, however, from taking that emergence as 
the endpoint, allowing us to recognise postmodernism as only a dialectical stage, 
just like postmodernity. Comprehending the nihilist dialectic, however, also 
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highlights why we cannot believe in dialectic as some kind of metaphysical 
principle that moves history forward in the abstract, but rather only as a form of 
understanding. Praxis is the complement of this dialectic, allowing a move from 
understanding to concrete worldly change. Setting praxis as the follow-up to 
dialectic returns us to a model that is more in line with the demand that the 
workers unite in revolutionary action (Marx and Engels 2002). That is, taking up 
nihilism allows us to better model the role of praxis in dialectically-understood 
history and to understand its role in empowering us through the return of active 
human subjectivity to the historical stage. 
THE NIHILIST PROJECT 
As a philosophical approach, nihilism rejects the fundamental values of the 
dominant mode of thought in order to posit a new, alternative set of values 
(Nishitani 1990; Nietzsche 1968). This critical approach is deeply tied to the 
dominance of idealist philosophy in Europe during and after the Enlightenment, 
arising as a direct response to the universalising style of Hegel (Nishitani 1990). 
Active nihilism responds to the idea of a system of universal and eternal values, 
seeking to examine the actual historical relations and benefits of that system 
(Nietzsche 2003b); to this end, the nihilists chase the principles of the system 
through to reveal their self-defeating aspect. However, proper nihilism does not 
stop here, instead moving towards the affirmation of a new set of values more in 
accord with actual reality and human experience and meant to promote human 
activity and the creation of a new world. This affirmation of the new is a crucial 
aspect in distinguishing active from passive nihilism, with the latter being a form 
that simply rejects what is dominant and leaves it at that. Active nihilism, with its 
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affirmative aspect, is amenable to revolutionary praxis and the revolutionary 
project in a way that passive nihilism and simple logical analysis are not. This is 
the type of nihilism being pursued by thinkers such as Nietzsche and Nishitani, as 
well as by later existentialist philosophers. Therefore, by fully modelling the 
nihilist project, we can develop a better model of the revolutionary project. 
 Emerging as a response to the philosophy of 19th-century Europe, nihilism 
is inherently linked to that idealist approach – the same approach that also 
underpins the bourgeois ideology that is dominant today. Primarily, Nietzsche 
(1968) argues that, under the Enlightenment episteme, the dominant system of 
values suggested its own groundlessness and overall untenability. Despite the 
Enlightenment philosophers’ pressing to break with tradition and use pure reason 
to ground understanding of the world, European philosophers continued to use 
Christian theology and ideas to ground their moral philosophy, and European 
society was justified by appeal to these principles (Nietzsche 2003a; 2003b). 
Cartesian reason and the cogito are directly attached to the idea that there exists a 
perfect god who bestowed upon human beings the ability to move towards that 
perfection (Descartes 2000). Similarly, the Hegelian dialectic and the movement 
towards absolute knowing is attached to the pre-existence of knowledge, and 
history becomes the movement of Spirit towards its perfection (Hegel 1977). Both 
of these approaches turn on the idea of perfectibility, and that perfectibility is 
justified by the existence of some perfect thing that transcends humanity. Even 
with the movement away from Descartes’s open Catholicism, positivist approaches 
keep the belief in some perfect being. Part of nihilism, then, is a turn away from a 
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belief in transcendent perfection and an acceptance of the element of human 
projects and the power relations that those projects imply (Nishitani 1990). 
The Enlightenment is taken as an ahistorical approach that, in attempting 
to be objective and detached, ignores the human relations that led to the 
development of the system of values it promotes and their connection to the times 
and to the advantages that the system offers one group over another (Nietzsche 
2003b). It is on this ground that Nietzsche puts forward his critique of the aspects 
European thought that made nihilism immanent in it, examining it as a system 
that has become dogmatic and ossified, using the language of universality and 
detachment to defend a system that is fundamentally human and historical. Values 
are developed initially through practical action oriented towards the development 
of some kind of power or domination of the world, but over time, this activity is 
obliviated and the values become entrenched in social relations (Nietzsche 2003b). 
There is a parallel here to the universalism that is so central to bourgeois thought, 
and to the approach of economic rationality that subsumes all interactions under 
the logic of profit, which elevates the economic above the human and ignores the 
way that the bourgeoisie established the dominance of capitalism through their 
own praxis. However, just because the activity that initially forms values is 
forgotten or hidden away does not mean that it does not exist; here, I find a return 
to the logic of praxis. From here, we can begin to understand the value of nihilism 
as a critique that aims to bring back the element of subjectivity and human activity 
to the model of society, history, and morality. 
 Responding to the self-defeating aspect of Enlightenment-derived 
European thought, nihilism is also a response to a type of crisis of thought. For 
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Nietzsche, this crisis is represented through the allegory of the death of God, which 
acts as a destructive force for the metaphysical model of the universe but has also 
not been broadly recognised (Nietzsche 1974; 2003c). Scientific method and the 
formalised conclusions of natural philosophy become codified as knowledge and 
reproduced through tradition, but there is insufficient examination of the 
human/practice aspect of these things. This prevents people from recognising the 
full importance of breaking away from the traditional power of the church. Within 
Nietzsche’s work, the death of God represents the collapse of the assumptions of 
the traditional power order as well as the value system built upon it, and is meant 
to problematise all of the fruits of that tree. However, just as the Cartesian cogito 
still maintains the assumption of God, thinkers who stay within the dogma of 
positivism cannot take scientific scepticism to its fullest extent. While Nietzsche’s 
allegory here makes the Christian theology most explicitly problematic, it also 
offers a more complete break from the dominant mode of Western thought and the 
entire metaphysical base (Davis 2011). Chasing scepticism all the way through 
means rejecting the belief in a pre-human perfection that produced absolute 
knowledge and, therefore, means rejecting the belief in knowledge as being 
revealed through investigation. Instead, we must acknowledge that knowledge is 
itself produced through human praxis and that, because of this, knowing and 
scientific pursuits are deeply connected to power relations.  
The breadth of this crisis cannot be overstated: fundamentally, what is at 
stake for the nihilists is the entire system of human thought and belief. In nihilism, 
the examination of the limits of the system also serves to negate its self-evidence, 
which is the great triumph of the universalist model (Nishitani 2011). By extension, 
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the project of active nihilism extends to the creation of an entirely new set of values. 
Realistically, while some phenomenal aspects of the previous system may be 
maintained in the new, pursuing such a deep critique of the origins of these 
principles and forms means they will be based on something that is not entirely 
compatible with the old. A break of this sort is a serious problem for the 
universally-oriented systems of Enlightenment idealism, which leads to the 
popular rejection of nihilism as a viable philosophical project. However, for those 
of us who are not attached to the bourgeois system of values, it is no problem at all. 
Instead, we can recognise nihilism and its dialectical character as a tool for 
allowing us to move beyond the bourgeois episteme and into something new. A 
rejection of the universal model that quashes the subjective to elevate the objective 
is a necessary condition for a proper and complete theory of revolutionary praxis. 
 Equally necessary, however, is a move towards a new affirmation, which is 
what separates active nihilism from passive. This type of affirmation requires the 
construction of a new type of subject, one who can accept their responsibility for 
their values, one that understands their subjectivity as a fundamental part of the 
world they live in (Nietzsche 2003c). To properly respond to the “death of God” 
and the devaluation of all values that follows on from it, human beings must reach 
a higher stage of historical consciousness and embrace their responsibility for their 
world (Nietzsche 1974). Here, we begin to see shades of the subject as a figure that 
is responsible, at least in part, for the structure of the world in which they live, 
rather than being only an epiphenomenon of supra-historical processes. For the 
universalist or the bourgeois, nihilism is to be rejected as passive because it denies 
the metaphysical element of the dominant system and draws attention to the 
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relations of history and power that maintain that dominance. For the anti-
bourgeois, nihilism becomes a project – a movement through the stage of negation 
towards an affirmation of something new. The mechanism of this affirmation is 
praxis. 
THE DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM 
Nihilism can be understood dialectically (Nishitani 1990). A dominant form of 
thought – in our case, the bourgeois universalist/idealist form – acts as the initial 
affirmation. Close examination of the principles of this model reveals that they are 
not as universal as the dogmatist would like – the negation. And from here, the 
human subject of history enters the scene, taking on the role of acting and willing 
in the world, affirming a new, humanistic set of values – the negation of negation. 
I find that a dialectical understanding nihilism allows both a better understanding 
of active nihilism as a complete project (as examined above) and an importation of 
nihilism to a sociological theory of praxis and change. That is to say, through 
dialectical reason, it is possible to move nihilism from the sphere of philosophy 
into the sphere of theory. Understanding nihilism dialectically also allows a 
rapprochement between social theories that are nihilistic in origin and those that 
are more traditionally critical; it allows us to connect Marxism and nihilism, and 
to more completely model the project of postmodernism.  
 Nietzsche’s dialectical critique of European values is very similar in form to 
how Marx critiques the principles of political economy. Marx’s view of capitalism 
as crisis-prone and tending towards a breakdown is also similar to how Nietzsche 
discusses the death of God as the central crisis of Western thought. Both 
approaches suggest that a crisis of order is inevitable in some form, implied by the 
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internal logic of the system. There is a difference in objects, with Marx being more 
interested in the capitalist-nationalist political economy while Nietzsche is 
attending to the objectivist-moralist anthropological ontology, but this suggests 
only that these two approaches may be complementary rather than overlapping. 
Conceptually, there is a similarity in how the two approaches aim to historicise 
systems that aim at being supra-historical and to return subjectivity to systems 
that seek to overrule it with abstract objective forms. While the exact details of this 
synthesis are outside the scope of this essay, it seems that there is a real “nihilist 
spirit” in Marx’s critique of capitalism and historical-materialist analytical 
framework. For example, Marx’s (1978b) push to focus on human activity in this 
world rather than the movement of abstract forms above the firmament mirrors 
Nietzsche’s (2003b) rejection of the detached approach. Another similarity is 
found in the idea that it is the ideas of the dominant class that become the 
dominant ideas of the time (Marx and Engels 1998), which directly parallels the 
idea that values and morality develop to defend the acts of the aristocracy 
(Nietzsche 2003b). Marx and Nietzsche share a focus on the element of human 
praxis in the (re)production of the conditions of human life and, by extension, how 
human work, not divine intervention, can change those conditions. 
 Another important aspect of the dialectic of nihilism is that it does not 
support a deterministic view of human existence, in opposition to the idealist 
approach that pins the perfectibility of the world to the revelations of Reason. This 
avoids the error of taking the dialectic as a metaphysical principle or a natural 
process, rather than a tool for understanding the world and the internal logic of 
institutions and processes. A belief in some superhuman power that would come 
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to reverse the fortunes of oppressor and oppressed and bring good into the world 
is the underpinning of the “slave morality” that Nietzsche rejects (Nietzsche 
2003b). People who believe in this form of otherworldly justice ignore the 
possibility of action in this world and construct a set of moral principles that defer 
their salvation to the next world (Nietzsche 2003b). This is, fundamentally, a 
rejection of praxis and of human freedom. In contemporary society, this is attached 
to a faith in democratic processes and models that take socialism as inevitable, or 
which preach an abstract form of charity for all (Nietzsche 2003b; Nishitani 1990). 
All of these forms are predicated on the belief in an otherworldly form that takes 
precedence over our actual, lived reality and the projects we take up therein – 
history is allowed to be determined in accordance with some set of principles, 
purportedly derived from reason, that exist above the human. This is the way that 
the Enlightenment repackages Christian cosmology rather than breaking with it, 
and it is the way that absolute worldviews derived from Enlightenment foreclose 
the possibility of praxis.  
Nihilism, then, aims at breaking away from this style of thought; the return 
of subjectivity to the world is incompatible with the belief in a model of progress 
that is based on a supernatural principle. The dialectic of nihilism, with its 
rejection of the divine and the universally reasonable, leads us to a style of thought 
that allows for change through human action, as a response to the historical and 
material conditions in the world and in line with human desires and goals, rather 
than leaving humanity as the objects of heavenly creatures. Active nihilism is 
separated from passive by this movement beyond the simple negation and into the 
affirmation of human action; in this way, the dialectical character is indispensable 
65 
 
 
 
to nihilism. While the universalist will seek to rebuke the nihilist as being quietly 
negative, we can see that playing out the dialectic here to its fullest extent allows 
for something far more open. 
 Losing determination is still something that we have to reckon with, and 
this is also part of the nihilist project. Facing the epistemological and ontological 
crises of emptiness (the death of God) means that human beings now have to 
accept a more active role in the creation of history and, therefore, in the creation 
of human existence (Nietzsche 1974). In contrast to universalising systems that 
seek to connect all eras to some set of abstract and unified principles, and therefore 
to elevate those principles above history – looking at all of time as if it were 
compressed into a single, dimensionless point – the nihilistic approach, in its 
attempt to return to human history, takes the negation of value as a starting point 
to post the establishing of new values (Nishitani 1990). As I mentioned earlier, 
examining the emergence of values and ideologies in terms of human activity and 
projects attaches to them the possibility of mutation through further activity. In 
fact, it is expected that other groups will eventually appropriate a set of values and 
turn them against the group that initially established them (Nietzsche 2003b). 
Within this framework, our attention is not to be turned back towards the origin of 
a set of values as an endpoint, but forwards towards the ways that we might change 
the world to meet our own ends. Moreover, because nihilism rejects the idea of a 
creator having made a perfect world that is simply playing itself out, even a full 
understanding of the past can never deliver salvation.  
Proper nihilism is, therefore, fundamentally future-oriented. The 
maintenance of present conditions, endlessly, is unacceptable. People who would 
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avoid risk and act simply to maintain their comfortable conditions over all else, to 
maintain an endless state of present free of any kind of strife and disagreement, 
are to be rejected. Nietzsche (2003c) describes this type of person as the “ultimate 
man”, who has reduced the world to its simplest and smallest form, and who is 
contrasted to the “superman” that is more affirmative, more this-worldly, and who 
seeks to be overcome in the future, endlessly. What emerges, then, is a need for a 
new type of subjectivity, a new understanding of humanity’s place in the world, 
that can affirm this future-orientation rather than simply appealing back to 
unmoving human essence, be it religious or psychological. Understanding history, 
human existence, and praxis as dialectically-related elements of the existential 
whole, rather than as things determined by God’s plan, allows for a theory of praxis 
and of social change that is simply not compatible with the universalist model and 
that, therefore, the universalist and their students can never arrive at. Reckoning 
with the loss of determination and the abandonment that follows the death of God 
is the only way that we can fully and properly arrive at such an understanding. 
 Overall, the dialectical aspect and approach is indispensable to nihilist 
thought, allowing the critique of the dominant episteme to move beyond a simple 
negativity and towards an affirmation of new values. Both in form and in content, 
this shows a similarity to Marx’s philosophy, which drew out the dialectic latent in 
bourgeois thought to point the way towards an alternative social arrangement. 
Central to this dialectic is the separation of active from passive nihilism and the 
understanding that passive nihilism is only a stage to pass through as a transition 
towards the active. Stopping at passive nihilism strands us in quietism, a rejection 
of traditional values without a new set to substitute for them. Existentialism can 
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help us at this point by offering a body of thought that is more affirmative of human 
existence and relation, emphasising these aspects as primary in the world, which 
lends itself more directly to a sociological approach and, overall, to a theory of 
praxis. Praxis, in turn, is necessary to this understanding because it allows for a 
movement away from inert and abstract philosophy and towards theory and action 
in the world. Following this turn, we can begin to understand the relation of 
nihilism to the future, which is also key to fully comprehending what is offered by 
nihilism and exactly what is limited by universal thought. 
NIHILISM, EXISTENTIALISM, AND THE SOCIAL 
While I am promoting a critique that uses nihilism as a tool, I find that the 
approach of the existentialist philosophers is more amenable to sociology than 
Nietzsche’s. Existentialism is still a nihilistic approach, rejecting the idea of a 
creator as well as the belief in perfection and determinism, but this body of work 
offers more of a focus on human relations, connections, and projection. In addition, 
because the existentialists were involved with Marxist politics in their lives and 
later turned their attention to how these politics connected to their philosophy, 
existentialism offers a very direct connection between nihilism and Marxism – and, 
by extension, nihilism and revolutionary praxis. 
Existentialism refigures nihilism for humanity. While Nietzsche is often 
quite individualist in his thinking, existentialists such as Sartre, de Beauvoir, and 
Merleau-Ponty placed more emphasis on the relations between people, the 
intersubjectivity of life, and the content of human projects. Being is taken as 
fundamental and comes before any kind of action, understanding, or meaning in 
the world (Sartre 1992). This means that what humans are and how they relate to 
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each other is not a result of divine creation or some innate human nature, but how 
people relate to each other and to the actions of those who came before them. Not 
only does this distinguish existentialism from earlier forms of nihilism, it allows 
for the philosophy to be more completely connected to social theory. Again, we can 
see the connection to the examination of human activity and the meeting of human 
needs. Human beings are distinguished from simple objects in the world, which 
are defined simply by the reason for their creation; instead, through their 
subjectivity and their choice of action, human beings define not only themselves 
but also what humanity as a whole ought to be (Sartre 2007). Still reckoning with 
the death of God and the loss of ontological security, existentialism here highlights 
the importance of purposive human activity (i.e., praxis) in the creation of social 
forms and meaning. De Beauvoir (2004) extends Sartre’s model by examining the 
relationships between people further, pointing out that these relations are 
themselves not given in advance but only determined through action and the 
connections and encounters between different projects. For both thinkers, it is 
necessary to take up projects that may never be completed, relying only on one’s 
own capacity for action but always in relation to others (de Beauvoir 2004; Sartre 
2004; 2007)  Moving past earlier forms of nihilism, existentialism is more 
affirmative regarding human projects in the world as regards both their meaning-
making and social aspects. Therefore, we can take existentialism as a model of 
active nihilism, a philosophy that spurs us towards “sensuous human activity” 
without appealing to universalist principles. 
As someone whose object is the connection of social relations to thought 
and action, I find existentialism useful primarily because of its attachment of those 
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relations to the problems raised by nihilism. Sartre (2007) discusses existentialism 
as a standpoint that is meant to open the possibility of human activity and to 
recognise the necessity of subjectivity in action and truth. This approach provides 
a road towards the formulation of active nihilism; while Nietzsche’s critique of 
Enlightenment reason and exploration of European nihilism are useful, he spends 
more time on the poetics of affirmation than on what, specifically, is to be affirmed, 
so there is a gap in terms of positive content for active nihilism to move towards. 
In existentialism, the ideas of nihilism are further developed in terms of human 
projects and how, in order to act in the world, it is necessary to constantly choose 
and to negate other possibilities (Sartre 2004). Implied here is a rejection of 
universal conclusions reached by reason, which is necessary in order to move 
beyond bourgeois thought and to ground a theory of praxis. On this same theme, 
de Beauvoir (2004) goes even further, rejecting the idea of a final and completed 
world as anti-human, connecting humanity to the pursuit of projects and changing 
the world. Ultimately, in terms of both values and mechanisms, existentialism 
centres the human in a way that goes beyond Nietzsche’s allusions. For this reason, 
I take existentialism as an approach that furnishes us with a more complete form 
of active nihilism. 
 Without returning to idealist unification and perfectibility, and without 
moving the social to a second order separate from the individual, existentialism 
explores human existence in a godless and indeterminate world. By valuing the 
human in this context, and by connecting one’s existence and projects to the 
existence of all others and their projects, existentialism moves beyond the simple 
rejections of passive nihilism and shows the possibility of a type of nihilistic 
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sociology. Moreover, I find within existentialism a genuinely active nihilism, a 
nihilism that emphasises the role of projected activity in the shaping of the world. 
After this, it is only a short jump towards the possibility of revolutionary praxis on 
the same grounds. 
NIHILISM AND THE FUTURE 
As discussed above, central to both the nihilist critique of bourgeois thought and 
the active form of nihilism is the relation of the philosophy to the future. Nihilism 
is not meant just to reject what is dominant, but to affirm something new. 
Rejecting the determinist worldview that is based on metaphysics and the eventual 
benevolence of God means also rejecting the model of progress that is so dear to 
the Enlightenment and that is used to justify bourgeois hegemony. Contrary to 
what we might think initially, progress of this sort is not something to be defended 
against nihilist critique and rejection, but a tool of dominance that forecloses on 
our possible futures rather than opening them. On the other hand, an active nihilist 
approach reopens these futures when the present is reconnected to human activity, 
human subjectivity, and human history. Moreover, the future becomes even more 
fertile ground when we embrace the approach of existence as being part of an 
overall flux and system of self-overcoming through action that is projected into the 
future (i.e., future-oriented) rather than something that is guided by a teleological 
approach grounded in a model of a perfect and timeless society. Breaking away 
from bourgeois philosophy to reclaim our future means that we must accept and 
pass through nihilism, not shy away from it to protect the prejudices of the 
Enlightenment and modernism. 
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 The Enlightenment paradigm offers a very rosy picture of the future, one in 
which society improves over time as it moves inexorably towards being identical 
with the rational model of the world. Fundamentally, this approach is based on 
Hegelian and Kantian philosophy, which emphasise the use of reason in 
developing a model of the world and the creation of systems that match that 
reasonable model as closely as possible. Of course, this is the underpinning and the 
justification of bourgeois hegemony – under capitalism, as systems become ever 
more rationally designed and optimised, the value of the economy and the nominal 
wealth of the people grow, indicating that society is better off. And, if these models 
are allowed to rule over and shape the development of society, society will 
necessarily come to conform to them. All of this is based on a fundamentally 
idealist and universalist approach to philosophy, one that moves strictly in the 
most abstract forms possible, derived from economistic models of human 
behaviour and interaction. History is only to be taken as the accumulation of data 
that reflects this supernatural process, not as an accretion of human works and 
crystallised projects. To the idealist of this type, there is no space for praxis, for 
practico-inertia, or for human subjectivity. Everything is reduced to the interplay 
of the ghosts of principles. Fundamentally, this is a system that maintains the 
theological/cosmological approach of pre-modern societies, but repackaged under 
the guise of reasoned understanding of the world. There can be no space outside of 
the system and there can be no threat to the model of social progress, as they are 
united and predicated upon each other. This is a world of tautology, a closed system 
that refers only to itself. Breaking away from such a system requires, then, not an 
analysis on its own terms – because the logic is totalising, the only thing such an 
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analysis can reveal is the soundness of the tautology – but a rejection of its 
fundamental values. We cannot bring idealism against idealism; the day will not 
be won with debate. 
 Idealist thought connects the past to the present and to the future not only 
in terms of causal relations or the growth of entropy in a closed system over time, 
but in terms of reducing everything that exists to its most abstract form. Doing so 
compresses time; rather than a transitional dialectic that allows for the three 
aspects to be united as a larger whole, the idealist puts forth a model of time as 
only one dimensionless point. Determinism of the type that the Enlightenment and 
positivism drive towards implies an unbroken and absolute chain of causality, one 
in which all events can be predicted or modelled with perfect accuracy given 
enough data about any single other event. Undergirding this model is the belief in 
a set of universal physical laws that govern all phenomena and that can be 
comprehended and applied by human beings. In this application, the human being 
would be removed from any subjective role in the unfolding of history – they would 
be the same as any other object, absolutely governed by these inviolable laws.  
There are, however, two problems with this type of deterministic approach: 
first, the amount of data required to actually do this kind of modelling is far beyond 
the scope of human management; second, the viewpoint required to understand 
the universe in this way is far more complicated than it initially seems. As a 
consequence of the universalist-idealist approach outlined here, humanity is not 
guaranteed a future, but only loses its capability to create one. This is the great 
cheat of universalism. First of all, the number of events and variables in universal 
history is incomprehensibly massive. Statistical analysis of all the factors involved 
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in the prediction of even a single event is difficult; to do so for the entire universe 
is, practically speaking, impossible, and it will remain impossible for the 
foreseeable future. The model of physical determinism makes a certain type of 
logical sense, of course – if physics exists and can be modelled, then it can be used 
to predict outcomes or to model the conditions that preceded an event, and so on. 
But this is, strictly speaking, an ideal model, not one that exists in the world. To 
treat history as if it was such a determined process, based only on the logical 
derivation of the possibility of potentially being able, at some point in the future, 
of complete prediction and modelling, is the height of reification. For the bourgeois, 
however, this approach brings a serious practical advantage: using this “scientific” 
method to describe history and the present, what is becomes what must be; what 
was becomes what must have been; and what will be becomes what must come to 
be. Injustice, suffering, and inequality all become excusable – in fact, beyond 
excuse – because they are reduced simply to statistical inevitabilities. Under all of 
this is nothing but the assumption of the existence of absolute knowledge and its 
comprehensibility to human minds. The bourgeois does nothing but construct a 
religious cosmology to justify their existence and to reinforce their ideological 
dominance. But the great chain of being cannot be contradicted from within – it is 
unassailable to the logic of idealism because it is the logic of idealism. Something 
outside of the system is required, an approach that breaks away at the base and 
accepts nothing of this model. And this approach cannot be defended only in ideas 
– it must be realised in action. 
 Second, the standpoint required for this idealist model is not the standpoint 
of the living human being or of the scientist, but the standpoint of God. The 
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observer, if they are not to interfere with the object of observation, must be outside 
of that object. The historian, then, must be separated from history if they are to 
observe it in this way. Idealism, in this way, separates the human from their being. 
One would only exist, in this paradigm, as the object of history, not as someone 
who acts and creates it through their action. And so, the future is lost – an object 
cannot act, only be acted upon. For the idealist, there is no human being, there is 
only the human, stripped of all its content and contingency. Observation, therefore, 
occurs at a superhuman level – an object cannot know any more than it can act, 
but observation demands a capacity for knowledge. To the idealist, at some point, 
there is a demand for a style of knowledge that transcends the empty abstraction 
of the human, but this role cannot be filled by scientists who are, after all, only 
human. Faith is the only solution. God returns to the scene of the idealist, now in 
some other metaphysical guise, to give this universe ground. 
 What the universalist, the idealist, and the bourgeois promise is a future of 
uninterrupted progress, a rising tide that will lift all boats. What they actually offer 
is nothingness, the execution of all things by their reduction to empty abstractions. 
Idealism is, fundamentally speaking, nothing more than a simple religion, backed 
by faith. This is what is revealed by the nihilist dialectic: dominant thought is 
nothing but the religion of the dominant. Idealism offers us no science, no history, 
and no future – it offers us only emptiness. In the end, the universalist is guilty of 
exactly what they accuse the nihilist of doing, putting forth a quietist system that 
negates the possibility of all action or understanding. This will not do! 
 We only accept that nihilism means nothing is possible when we accept the 
idealist’s position. Allowing a negation of this absolute worldview instead allows 
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us to return to historical understanding and to the world of human subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity. Active nihilism gives us the ground to reopen our future by 
rejecting its determination by the system of bourgeois values. From here, praxis 
returns as a possibility because we can recognise human beings not as abstract 
objects, but as the subjects of history. Revolution is returned to us, not as an 
inevitability, and not as an abstraction of economy, but as the real potential for 
action in the world to realise what we can be. 
INTEGRATION 
At this point, I have begun to move away from bourgeois thought and economic 
relations. The previous two chapters existed to give this one its necessary context: 
nihilism could not have been developed without the Enlightenment’s detachment 
and anti-humanism. Immanent critique must always keep in mind its relation to 
the object of that critique and the inseparability of the elements of dialectical 
progression. Nihilism presents the antithesis or the negation of idealist 
universalism, a turning point that is necessary to move away from the current 
system of domination. Incorporating praxis and an understanding of projected 
human being, looking towards the future, develops active nihilism, and it is at this 
point that we can begin to truly understand revolutionary praxis. Revolution, after 
all, is an activity meant to bring a radical shift in how our social world is organised. 
In order to fully develop this idea, I first had to situate what was to be rejected and 
then ground that rejection. 
 Just as bourgeois thought conditions and orients the idea of proletarian 
revolution, so does idealist universalism engender nihilism. Both revolution and 
nihilism are conscious responses to the conditions and constraints of an order that 
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makes one group dominant over another. Additionally, both require a rejection of 
the most fundamental elements of that order, which makes the two compatible. 
What nihilism brings to the model of revolution is an escape from the 
Enlightenment value of perfectibility and the positivist concept of determinism. 
Instead, through nihilism, I believe we can ground revolution truly on the goal of 
liberation. Existentialism, as a philosophy that is meant to affirm human 
possibility and which further develops nihilism, was introduced as a tool for 
connecting the social to the nihilistic. In this chapter, I have presented the 
fundamental tools of my critique and my reasoning for the revolutionary project. 
 In the next chapter, I will be examining modernism and postmodernism. As 
a parallel to the second chapter, modernism is the ideological component of 
contemporary capitalism, with postmodernism emerging as a conscious response. 
I contend that nihilism offers a framework for understanding the emergence of 
postmodernism as well as its project. Just as I did here for nihilism, I aim to sketch 
how postmodernism, though it seems overwhelmingly negative at first, actually 
offers a space to develop an active break away from the current order. As such, 
postmodernism mirrors the structure of nihilism and the problematic of passive-
versus-active forms. 
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IV. (POST)MODERNISM 
Within philosophy, nihilism emerged as a critique of the dominant style of idealism 
and universalism that itself emerged from the Enlightenment. In contemporary 
society, a similar critique has emerged in the form of postmodernism. 
Postmodernism brings the ideas of nihilism – challenging the system by revealing 
its fundamental groundlessness – against modernism, a form of bourgeois 
ideology. In particular, postmodernism addresses the system of social 
epistemology and ontology that has been constructed on the belief in the ontic 
reality of capitalism. That is, postmodernism responds to the style of truth claims 
made by academics working in institutions under the conditions of capitalist 
economics. This also involves a critique of how knowledge and truth claims have 
been transformed by recent technological advances and changes in the structure 
of media. By examining the critique postmodernism offers, it is possible for us to 
better understand what this nihilism really means for the future of society and the 
possibility of social change. 
 My contention is that postmodernism is a form of nihilism that is 
specifically adapted to the ideology of contemporary capitalism and neoliberalism, 
and to the condition of postmodernity in which capitalism has become deeply 
entrenched in the social structure and the state has been made to support the 
structure of the economy. Due to this adaptation, I find that postmodernist thought 
raises interesting and useful objections specific to the contemporary condition and 
that it is a useful approach for that reason. Additionally, taken as a particular form 
of nihilism, I find that postmodernism is useful in returning the focus of 
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sociological investigation to the model of human praxis and the interactions and 
conflicts between different, competing projects. This allows a breaking away from 
the positivist and universalist style of sociology that is more amenable to bourgeois 
ideology. 
 Often, postmodernism has been set in contrast to Marxism, another critical 
theory, but one more closely associated with modernism and modernity. Orthodox 
Marxists tend to consider these two positions incompatible, as postmodernism 
expresses a scepticism regarding the determination of the future and, supposedly, 
the possibility of an economic and social revolution (Callinicos 1990). Within 
orthodox Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, the dialectic is elevated from a mode 
of understanding to a determining historical process that makes revolution 
inevitable, rather than revolutionary action being taken up by the proletariat in 
their capacity as human beings acting in the world (Sartre 2004; de Beauvoir 1976). 
However, this is a fallacious position, as it mistakes the ontological claim of Marx’s 
historical materialist framework and divorces history from human action and 
projected being. This mode of thought also elevates the dialectic from a model of 
understanding to a model of the progression of history; in a way, the approach 
returns to the Hegelian idealist dialectic, rather than maintaining Marx’s 
materialist approach. Instead, there is a possibility of a praxis that goes outside 
and against the idealist system of modernism, and this possibility is affirmed by 
the negation of the system’s universality. In connecting postmodernism to nihilism, 
I also aim to develop the potential within postmodernism to propose a model that 
does not have to appeal back to the principles and projects of modernism, which 
derive from bourgeois thought. With this project in mind, I find postmodernism to 
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be amenable to the spirit of Marx’s own philosophy and theory, even though it 
rejects some of the assumptions that comes out of later Marxist thought. 
 Postmodernism also opens questions of social epistemology and ontology 
that must be addressed at some point. As a position that challenges the dominant 
school of bourgeois thought and the truth claims of positivism, postmodernism 
offers a model that is incompatible with much of that body of knowledge. I believe 
that, in rejecting the idea of universal truth, postmodernism offers space to 
formulate a different model of the subjectivity and intersubjectivity of knowledge. 
As such, questions of what subjects are, how they relate to each other, and what 
knowledge means emerge. Understanding at least the broadest strokes of these 
questions and their implications is another necessary point in developing the 
relation of postmodernism and nihilism to the possibility of revolutionary praxis 
and social change in the future. 
MODERNISM AND SOCIETY 
In the traditional Marxist framework, society involves both the material conditions 
and working relations of the economic base and the epistemological and 
ontological conditions of the ideological superstructure. While the praxis of those 
living in a society occurs at the material level, organised structurally by economic 
relations, those relations and the power structures they engender are maintained 
and reproduced by the ruling class ideology that dominates in society. In bourgeois 
society, the economic base is that of modernity and postmodernity as outlined in 
the second chapter; the ideological superstructure, in turn, is modernism. Derived 
from the principles of bourgeois thought, this style of thought aims to naturalise 
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the view of capitalist modernity as the peak of society in order to maintain the 
metastability of capitalism. 
 One of the central principles of modernism is the quest to organise all of 
existence under a universal guiding category, generally taking the rational 
economic actor as its prototype for human existence. Modernism’s narrative holds 
that the use of categories developed by the use of Reason could bring a structure to 
the world by making things intelligible and revealing the forms that undergird the 
existence of all things (Bauman 1992). This project is, of course, an extension of 
the Enlightenment philosophy and idealist universalism that birthed the bourgeois 
ideology overall, and it is the ideological connective tissue between bourgeois rule 
and the continuation of liberal-capitalist society. Sociologically speaking, 
modernism is also deeply connected to the positivist paradigm advanced by 
Auguste Comte and to the empiricist-scientific approach that continues to 
dominate sociological knowledge production processes (Bauman 1992). Here, we 
can see that modernism is attached not only to the political organisation of society, 
but to the deeper philosophical issues of epistemology and ontology; through 
modernism and its press for order, all human knowledge becomes subsumed into 
the bourgeois order and shot through with the power relation that implies. That is 
to say, the knowledge produced by human investigation is not separable from the 
organisation of human lives through society. As Marx and Engels (1998) note, the 
material dominance of the ruling class makes their ideas the dominant ideas of 
society, hence the connection between the bourgeois ideology and modernism, and 
hence the naturalisation and ontologisation of the liberal-capitalist social order. 
Understanding this element as central to modernism is vital to understanding the 
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later critique mounted in postmodernism, and so it must be kept in mind. 
Fundamentally, we can understand modernism as the particular form of bourgeois 
ideology connected to modernity, meant to universalise the system of bourgeois 
thought and values. 
 Over time, however, modernism – just as modernity – transformed and 
intensified to further cement bourgeois control and to respond to challenges to its 
system of thought. With these changes came the emergence of the principle of 
capitalist realism, the belief that capitalism is the only possible system of social 
organisation or that capitalism is coterminous with reality (Fisher 2009). In 
accordance with the idealism and universalism underpinning bourgeois thought, 
capitalism is transformed into the organising principle of human interaction and 
exchange. Ideas and models such as Homo economicus and rational choice are 
connected to this type of realism, allowing it to be embedded at all points in our 
sociological understanding. More importantly, however, is the supposed teleology 
of capitalism within the entirety of history – under capitalist realism, all of history 
builds towards neoliberal capitalism and it becomes impossible to imagine its 
ending without the simultaneous end of the world (Fisher 2009). The same 
principle was expressed in Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 piece “The End of History?”, 
which attempts to argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ascendance 
of American liberal capitalism to the status of sole world system was the realisation 
of Hegel’s subject/object identity. This belief in the ontological reality of capitalism 
is also key to modernism as an ideology and, in turn, key to understanding 
postmodernism as a critique of that ideology. Ultimately, what Fukuyama presents 
and Fisher is critical of is a naturalisation of capitalism and bourgeois society, its 
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conversion from a social order to an ontological principle. Idealist thought, 
however, has been aimed all along at such a conversion, as the universalist 
ontology and the positivist episteme that it has been connected to in science both 
operate in the pursuit of a single principle to give structure to all things. Within 
sociology, we can see the intersection of these two projects as giving rise to 
modernist ideology as a result of the praxis and practico-inertia of the bourgeois 
revolutions of the 18th century. 
 Recognising modernism, the principle of capitalist realism, and the idea of 
the end of history as the dominant ideology in contemporary society sets the stage 
for the critique of that ideology. What we are faced with is a style of thought that is 
derived from the Enlightenment paradigm and, concomitantly with the political-
economic transformations of modernity and postmodernity, makes the bourgeois 
social order and the capitalist economic system of ontic importance. Within this 
model, bourgeois society is transformed from being historically derived (and 
therefore historically contingent) to being historically teleological. Positivist 
approaches and the tools of technocratic sociology have proven indispensable in 
this pursuit of identifying capitalist history with human history, and we can begin 
now to see the entire system of ideas and belief that can stem from here. As such, 
it is from this point, the revelation of the fullness of the system, that we can begin 
to critique it. 
THE POSTMODERNIST CRITIQUE 
Postmodernism is a critique of modernism. While it can be difficult to identify 
particular content, especially positive content, within the multitude of approaches, 
styles, and fields that come into play in postmodernism, the relation to modernism 
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is inescapable. This is because postmodernism is dialectically connected to 
modernism – just as postmodernity is to modernity. For the current chapter, this 
is my lodestar when discussing postmodernism. Going forward, postmodernism 
will be taken as a system, dialectically derived, that comes self-consciously into 
contact with modernism as a dominant ideology and system of social belief without 
appealing to the principles and goals of modernism and with the aim of examining 
and rejecting the latent assumptions of that system. In understanding the broad 
contours of this critique, its most general grounding, we can begin to see what it 
offers us – as both sociologists and as human beings – in terms of future-
orientation and the affirmation of possible praxis. 
 With that said, let us examine the relation of postmodernism to modernism. 
Part of the principle of capitalist realism, that form of modernism particular to 
neoliberal society, is that it does not confront the modern (Fisher 2009). Such a 
confrontation would be outside of the epistemological horizon of the idealism 
undergirding the system: to confront its bases would mean acknowledging the 
existence of a reason to confront its bases. Instead, by consciously not confronting 
those bases, it is possible for those bases to be reified (in discourse, in scientific 
approaches, and in models such as Homo economicus) and to be ontologised. 
Postmodernism, on the other hand, consciously comes into contact with 
modernism and turns its attention to the historical and philosophical bases of the 
system, aiming to break through it and examine the assumptions underlying the 
structure of systematic truths (Bauman 1992). Self-consciousness and reflexive 
critique are vital to this approach, as they allow a direct response to the ontological 
claims that the system of modernism both makes and masks (Hutcheon 1989). 
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Presenting modernity as the highest stage of human development, when connected 
to the metaphysics of universalism and the reification of the future through 
scientific determinism, modernism makes history teleological. According to the 
modernists – again, this is most apparent in Fukuyama’s invocation of Hegelian 
identity – there must be a kind of purpose to history, one accessible to human 
reason, and the general dominance of capitalism has revealed it to be capitalism’s 
development. Believing in this system requires the assumption of its ontology, that 
the socio-economic and political-economic systems can exist in a way that 
transcends human being and activity, and it is exactly this ontological assumption 
that postmodernism aims to confront. Genealogy of ideas is one of the techniques 
that comes onto the scene at this point, opposing the linear development of ideas 
and values with a model examining the complex situations and relations of politics 
and existence, emphasising disparity, disagreement, and development instead of 
origin (Foucault 1977). Starting here is meant to highlight just how important the 
connection of modernism to postmodernism is: in dialectical terms, we can see 
postmodernism as nothing more than the negation of modernism. 
 Examining postmodernism as a negation, it behooves us to understand 
exactly what is being negated. I provided a broad outline of modernism earlier, as 
the ideological superstructure of contemporary society, and this holds – broadly. 
As such, we can – broadly – take postmodernism as a response to this ideological 
superstructure. More specifically, though, we can situate postmodernism as a 
response to the epistemology, the way of knowing, that exists in this system.  
Here, both Baudrillard and Lyotard provide useful descriptions of condition 
of postmodern knowledge, thought, and response. Both thinkers recognise that 
85 
 
 
 
there has been a shift in the model of knowledge and the presentation of truth in 
postmodernity, and each provides aspects of what this model looks like. Lyotard 
(1984) rejects the idea that scientific knowledge is cumulative over time, instead 
emphasising its existence among, and competition with, other forms of knowledge. 
As such, he puts the position of scientific knowledge and the claim of universal 
truth derived from reason into question. Rather than simply revealing truth, 
scientific knowledge has a relation to power and to ethics, and its legitimacy above 
other forms allows scientific knowledge to become truth in an ontological way that 
is denied to other approaches (Lyotard 1984). Lyotard’s argument connects 
scientific knowledge, which is presented as universal and strictly rational, back to 
the political and power systems of bourgeois society. Negating modernism’s ontic 
claims begins with negating the epistemological claim of neutrality; instead of 
knowledge floating above these social systems, it is produced by them. Rejecting 
the model of revelatory knowledge production allows us, instead, to conceive of a 
this-worldly knowledge: knowledge as connected to human praxis and power 
relations and the creation of knowledge becomes a human project, with all that 
entails. Access to knowledge, the form of communication, and the ability of 
messages to act agonistically to the system that produces them all become 
important in postmodern knowledge production (Lyotard 1984). Knowledge, for 
critics, becomes a tool for rejecting and changing the system, rather than a 
revelation of its ultimate truth. At the same time, however, there is a rejection of 
“grand narratives” that are associated with the traditional model of knowledge 
production – a rejection that is necessary to break away from the teleological 
model of history (Lyotard 1984). Grand narratives offer a type of history in which 
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things get better (i.e., are perfected) over time and move towards a specific final 
stage with no real possibility of alternative or human intervention. Just as 
genealogy opens up an area of dispute in the history of concepts, this rejection of 
grand narrative and teleology opens up an area of dispute in their future; both are 
aspects of deconstructing the totalising and universalising systems of modernism. 
No longer must we accept the reified model of determinism that the idealists built. 
The only question, then, is that of what comes to fill the void (praxis, projected 
being, future-orientation). 
 While Lyotard examines and rejects the system of knowledge production, 
Baudrillard gives more attention to the system of reproduction and the 
postmodern style of truth. While modernism and capitalist realism identify the 
knowledge produced by the system with reality, Baudrillard (1994) argues that the 
system of knowledge makes, in fact, no reference to reality whatsoever. Just as 
capitalist realism does not confront modernity in order to escape the 
epistemological problem of alternative systems, modernism does not confront 
anything outside of itself to allow the elevation of its truth. Truth claims made in 
this system are bolstered by two approaches: making events conform to statistical 
and philosophical models, which elevates those models to a state of “hyperreality”; 
and a disavowal, through political and discursive methods, of elements that do not 
conform to the values of the system – but crucially, not through any material or 
practical response, and without actually identifying those systematic values 
positively (Baudrillard 1994). Knowledge produced by the system becomes self-
referential and closed off to the outside, and the question of alternative ontologies 
or epistemologies is largely eluded by ignoring it while paying lip service to having 
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already addressed it. Anything can be facilitated in this system by rejection of its 
opposite, because there is no material change or worldly action associated with it. 
What emerges is an idealist system that is capable of constant adaptation to social 
pressure because it has no positive content at all, only rejected negative content, 
and which relies on the proof of its truth through that rejection of its untruth to 
ground itself, a system of self-reference and closure to worldly reality. This is a 
system in which scientific models, through their taking on of hyperreality, become 
more real than real – metaphysically ontic. 
 Postmodernism is a critique of modernism, a response to the truth claim of 
modernism and a connection of that truth claim to historical processes and praxis. 
Modernism uses the principles of idealism and universalism to construct an 
episteme that is self-referential and self-ontologising, detached from reality and 
history, and postmodernism takes aim at the fundamental assumptions and claims 
of that system. That is, postmodernism examines the highest values of modernism 
and rejects them in order to lay the ground for us to posit a new, alternative system 
of values. 
POSTMODERN NIHILISM 
Nihilism finds a particular expression in postmodernism, just as positivism finds 
a particular expression in capitalist realism. Examining the values of modernism, 
the truth claims and the ontology of the bourgeois ideology, postmodern thought 
reveals that it is ultimately hollow. Rather than scientific method revealing to us 
an otherworldly and universal set of principles, we find ourselves confronted with 
a system that will not refer to anything outside of itself other than as a way to 
implicitly reaffirm its own perfection. Working towards a situation outside of and 
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against this system, postmodernism exists also as a response to, and rejection of, 
the positivist style of sociology. Now, we can turn our attention to what the nihilism 
of postmodernism means for sociology and for the society of human beings as a 
whole. 
 First of all, we should properly examine and explain the nihilism of 
postmodernism. Like with nihilism as a whole, this nihilism is not meant to be a 
surrender to despair or an ontologisation of meaninglessness. Instead, we are 
faced with the same kind of ontology of Nothing that Nietzschean and existentialist 
philosophy come to face. And, just as with those forms of thought, there is some 
history to understand in postmodern nihilism. To wit, postmodernism first 
emerged after the protests of 1968 failed to deliver systemic change and the end of 
capitalism, and the disenchantment with grand narratives and belief in future 
salvation is a reflection of postmodernist academics’ observation of this failure 
(Callinicos 1990). Later on, the collapse of the Soviet Union also brought with it 
the image of the failure of Marxism and, in particular, the failure of a communist 
revolution. These events, combined with the pessimism that had emerged in 
Continental philosophy following the World Wars, produce the scepticism and 
nihilism present in postmodernism. The mindset that emerged in this context is 
linked to a destructive attitude towards, apparently, all structures, turned against 
the structures of meaning to address the ontology of truth (Bauman 1992). That is, 
the whole system of meaning and knowing becomes the object of postmodernist 
critique, with the goal being to dismantle the structures that allow the linkages of 
claims and ideas that is necessary to produce an apparently-universal system of 
thought. What Callinicos and other thinkers who reject postmodernism because of 
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its nihilism get wrong is where nihilism stops; just as Nietzsche did earlier, 
postmodern nihilism is meant to move beyond negation towards the affirmation 
of a new set of values, one more in accordance with the principle of reality in terms 
of this-worldliness and human involvement. Rather than remaining in the space of 
reification and idealism, the new style of truth claims and social organisation 
should be connected to real human praxis and how human beings produce their 
knowledge. Again, Baudrillard (1994) provides a clear example of this: in the last 
chapter of Simulacra and Simulation, he affirms his own nihilism, but as a call to 
action, associating political radicalism with active nihilism and imagination with 
the reversal of ideas. Thus, we can see postmodernism as nihilism in the stage of 
negation, oriented towards active nihilism but not yet completely separated from 
the passive nihilism engendered by the system which it critiques. 
 Connection of the type of the negation to the initial affirmation is 
characteristic of the middle stage of the dialectic, and here postmodernism mirrors 
postmodernity in being an incomplete breakage from its predecessor and, instead, 
being part of a transitional dialectic. Within the general discourse, this position has 
posed a problem for postmodernist thought – of course, mediated by the fact that 
the dominant and default style is still that of positivism and the dominant ideology 
that of modernism. For example, Callinicos (1990) partially bases his critique on 
the idea that postmodernism lacks faith in revolution, does not make a complete 
break with the past,  and shies away from politics. Critiques such as these, though, 
only make sense if one takes postmodernism not as the negation but as the 
negation-of-negation, the third stage of the dialectic, and they also imply a belief 
in a positivist style of dialectic that tends almost to the metaphysical – this is 
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especially important in the light of “faith in the revolution.” Part of the problem 
here is that postmodernism intentionally makes use of self-consciousness and self-
contradiction, both things that are problematic to those who maintain the 
positivist and detached view of science that follows from the Enlightenment 
(Hutcheon 1989). As I discussed earlier, however, these approaches are a 
purposive response to modernism’s lack of self-consciousness and intentional 
ignorance of self-contradiction. Moreover, techniques such as these are in line with 
Nietzsche’s (2003b) belief that critical philosophy has no right or need to attempt 
to be detached from history, real conditions, and individuals’ values. Self-
contradiction and the use of irony are, in fact, central parts of the approach of 
dialectical reason, used to reveal, highlight, and problematise the contradictions of 
the system being examined. A complete break of the type Callinicos seems to 
demand is not possible, frankly, within a dialectical framework at all, but is doubly 
impossible at the middle stage. Instead of rejecting postmodernism because it is 
incomplete, I contend that we should understand it as nihilism and as a rejection 
of modernism that acts as the start of completing something outside of the 
dominant order. 
 Claiming that postmodernism is strictly apolitical is also a mistake, but one 
that is more complicated and understandable. As a negation, postmodernism 
confronts modernism with its own fundamental nihilism and brings nihility into 
focus. Negative in style, this is still meant as a political act, as it directly confronts 
the political system, addressing its hypocrisy, the complicity of inaction, and the 
systems of naturalisation and ontologisation that act as ideological supports to the 
political-economic order (Hutcheon 1989). Admittedly, postmodernism does show 
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a lack of positive content, but this is not endemic to the position as nihilistic unless 
one stops at the stage of negation rather than following on to the affirmation of 
something new. Moving towards something new means first rejecting what is – the 
negation precedes the negation-of-negation. Apolitics, then, is the territory of 
either the passive nihilist or the positivist that refuses to grapple with nihility, not 
of the postmodern nihilist who aims towards self-overcoming. Moreover, the 
problem only holds when one commits to a dogmatic postmodernism. If we accept 
that postmodernism is incomplete – which it is – then there is still a space to draw 
political inspiration from other systems. West (1991) finds in this space a 
possibility for rapprochement between Marxism and postmodernism, using 
Marxist ideas to fill in some of the political vacuum that emerges from the rejection 
of modernism while also using postmodernist nihilism to build on the historicism 
of Marxism while avoiding teleological models. Overall, what we have to 
acknowledge is that postmodernism is incomplete, not that it is apolitical; but this 
brings us back only to its position as negation. If we, as radicals and social critics, 
want to move forward, active nihilism and creative destruction are still available – 
if we are willing to seize them. 
 Lost also to the postmodernist is faith in the revolution. From the 
perspective of orthodox Marxism, scepticism of grand narratives means rejecting 
socialist revolution tout court (Callinicos 1990). From the perspective of orthodox 
Marxism. Scepticism about grand narratives does not mean that the contradiction 
within the system’s logic disappears, only that we can no longer rely on it to 
produce for us an inevitable salvation (Lyotard 1984). This is nothing new to 
historical materialism: changes in historical conditions, the construction of society 
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itself, are to be seen as the result of human subjectivity and action, the results of 
praxis, not as the simple playing out of a divine dialectic of history (Marx 1978b). 
Yet again, in losing our determined future, we do not lose the possibility of acting 
to create a future, only the reification of statistics. Nihilism is no funeral for action. 
 Recognising postmodernism as nihilism in the mode of dialectical negation, 
a movement that confronts the system with its own lack of foundation, opens up 
questions of alternative ontology in the same way that Nietzsche’s model of 
European nihilism opened questions of opposing the Enlightenment. In rejecting 
positivism, postmodernism should not be critiqued along positivist lines, but 
should be recognised for the potential it brings into the world. This is an approach 
that continues the project of critical philosophy by directly confronting a dominant 
system of ideology – modernism – in order to move beyond it. With the dialectical 
model of nihilism that I offered earlier, we can also see a connection between 
nihilism and immanent critique, that nihilism is teasing out elements latent in 
bourgeois thought and pursuing them until they reveal an internal failing. 
Stopping too early with postmodernism is a mistake, but recognising it as nihilistic 
is not – as long as one is willing to move through the negation to the affirmation of 
the new. 
POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIOLOGY 
Sociologically, the nihilism of postmodernism opens up important questions 
regarding social ontology and epistemology. Comte aimed to found sociology as 
the highest of the positivist sciences, and practitioners in the field grapple with that 
legacy to this day. As a form of nihilism, postmodernism is incompatible with this 
position, and brings into question the relation of sociology to modernism. Since 
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sociology is concerned with crisis and with questions of change and revolution, it 
does us some good to explore, however briefly, these questions. 
 Positivism is deeply connected to the existing system of ideology. 
Traditionally, positivist knowledge bolstered the system and critical knowledge 
opposed it, but this becomes problematic in postmodernism (Lyotard 1984). Since 
it is dealing with a system that is so all-encompassing and so self-referential, 
postmodern thought must be aware of its position in this system and the way that 
complicity is enforced in a way that is not totally escapable through reason alone 
(Hutcheon 1989). Knowledge no longer emerges through divine revelations or 
through a type of reason that is ahistorical and universal, instead being socially 
produced and situated, always carrying some relation to the diffusion of power in 
society. Facing us now is a situation where, as knowers and as producers of 
knowledge, we have to acknowledge the aspect of human creation, appropriation, 
and use of knowledge. That is to say, we must acknowledge knowing as a type of 
praxis in itself and, therefore, as something that can and has become practico-inert. 
No longer can we trace social facts through their antecedent social facts in the 
Durkheimian style, as we have revealed the Nothing at the base of the system. This 
does allow, however, a new return to historical materialism, which allows a starting 
point of human existence, projected against and over that ontic Nothing, in the 
analysis of the establishment of society and the social order. In this way, embracing 
postmodernism allows us to break from traditional sociology and move towards 
critical thought. 
 As a body of knowledge, the importance and position of sociology changes 
as a result of postmodernist critique, and we must confront these changes. 
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However, at the moment and within the confines of this chapter, this is all I can do. 
A fuller exploration of postmodern social epistemology and ontology is a task for 
another day. 
INTEGRATION 
In this chapter, I presented my understanding of postmodernism as a response to, 
and rejection of, modernism. Modernism, as an ideology, is linked to the 
emergence of bourgeois domination in the period of modernity and to the shift of 
bourgeois ideology from revolutionary to conservative. Since bourgeois thought 
and bourgeois dominance make extensive use of universalist truth claims, idealist 
epistemology, and rationalising models, postmodernism rejects these things. 
Taking postmodernism as a form of nihilism and taking nihilism in turn as an 
immanent critique of the fundamental assumptions of a dominant style of thought, 
we can understand the postmodernist project as being aimed at showing the 
inconsistency and emptiness of the foundations of modernism. Since modernism 
is connected to the domination of the present and bourgeois ideology is connected 
to the maintenance of bourgeois power, postmodernism also offers the ground to 
propose an alternative to the systems that maintain this dominance and power. 
 Returning to the dialectical model and the principles of immanent critique, 
it is necessary for something to be fully developed before its internal contradictions 
can be apprehended and an alternative developed. As such, postmodernism is 
connected to the most recent form of capitalism (neoliberalism) and to the 
condition of postmodernity that emerges as a result of material transformations. 
To my mind, this makes postmodernism useful when trying to address the style of 
epistemology and ontology that are emerge in those conditions, especially in terms 
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of breaking away from teleological and trans-historical models. In line with the 
content of the previous chapter and the idea of nihilism as a tool of critique, I find 
postmodernism to be a useful tool in addressing the specifics of contemporary 
capitalism. Moreover, because it is nihilistic, postmodernism does not have to 
bend to the principles of modernism, which allows us to avoid the problem of 
trying to escape a system of practico-inertia by appealing to its own internal 
principles, an issue I discussed in the second chapter. For me, this is another part 
of what makes postmodernism useful and necessary in contemporary thought. 
 In the next chapter – the last substantive chapter of this essay – I will turn 
my attention towards the concept of “negation of negation” in terms of what the 
future might look like, taking up postmodernism as a nihilist critique of 
modernism. That project is the development of a future that is not teleological or 
universal in the style of modernism’s models and reification. Instead, our potential 
future should be attached directly to human praxis and should return the human 
subjectivity that was lost in bourgeois thought’s reification of the economic. This 
includes a belief in the possibility of revolutionary action and transformation of the 
system that is foreclosed under bourgeois domination. What I will offer, then, is a 
prelude to a new future. 
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V. THE WORK OF THE FUTURE 
Having set our stage, we now come to the central question of this essay, the form 
of the future and the relation of that form to the possibility of revolutionary praxis. 
Here, I am responding to a style of future that is constructed and defended by the 
bourgeois philosophy and the ideology of modernism. This is a future that reifies 
statistical models and ontologises capitalist models to make that future a simple 
extension of what already exists. In this way, the bourgeoisie forecloses on the 
possibility of change in the future and justifies their own continued existence. By 
refuting the fundamental claims of this system and showing the nothingness at its 
base – that is, through the encounter of nihilism – I will show that there is, in fact, 
a different possibility altogether, one that appeals to the worldly existence of 
human beings and opens the possibility of changing the world through praxis. The 
introduction of this space for difference and the possibility of change return to us 
the possibility of revolution that the bourgeoisie have tried to foreclose on in 
contemporary society. 
 In order to develop the two opposing conceptions of the future, present-
orientation and future-orientation, I will examine the consequences of the 
bourgeois ideology for the model of the future and the break that historical context 
and postmodernist critique offer. Present-orientation takes the future as mainly a 
continuation of present circumstances, or as only a logical consequence of those 
circumstances; future-orientation takes the future as an open space, in which 
freely-chosen projects can be realised. In promoting the perspective of future-
orientation, I am offering a model of the future that can be tied directly to praxis 
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and human projects. This shift in understanding, which moves away from 
bourgeois thought, serves to re-open the possibility of revolution. Afterwards, I will 
describe the shift that future-orientation entails and the possibility of a new future 
that it affords us. 
 Taking up the standpoint of nihilism and the goal of developing a form of 
active nihilism, I want to move beyond the teleological style of modernism and 
determinism. My desire is to unite the model of the future with an understanding 
of society and knowledge as the products of human praxis. The future, then, 
becomes the site of our projects, even when they might come into conflict. Nihilism 
and postmodernism move us away from a belief in some universal process or 
principle by which all goals might be reconciled and humanity might be delivered 
from its imperfections, but this also serves to reopen the future that has been 
closed off from us by the bourgeoisie. Because I believe that it is praxis that makes 
history and that will shape the future, I believe also that taking up the project of 
active nihilism and the affirmation of new values allows the return of a 
revolutionary possibility that modernism and capitalist realism must reject. 
 A shift in our orientation to the future is a serious shift in commitment, 
comportment, and relation. Shifting views here has implications for how we 
understand both what is and what could be. One of these implications is that we 
must face the loss of change and the inevitability of revolution and instead come to 
see it as a possibility that can only be realised by worldly praxis. What I am pushing 
for at this point is a fundamental reordering and re-relating of human activity to 
the existence of the world.  
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THE FORECLOSURE OF THE FUTURE BY THE COWARD BOURGEOISIE 
The logic of the bourgeois ideology, and of modernism in particular, has serious 
implications for the form of the future and its relation to human activity. In short, 
the idealist ontology, the reification of statistical models, and the use of state power 
to maintain the metastable system of neoliberal capital divorces the future from 
human praxis and converts human beings into absolute objects. Instead of active 
subjects that choose their projects and whose praxis develops the socio-historical 
conditions in which they live, the bourgeois model would have us believe that it is 
the playing out of superhuman economic forces and the development of rational 
knowledge that direct the course of history. However, the development of this 
belief is itself a form of praxis and a project aimed at the continuation of bourgeois 
domination. The bourgeoisie still exists as a class of human beings, and this class 
still wants to keep its power. Converting the future into the simple product of a 
hyperreal and reified model both transforms that model into an ontological 
necessity and forecloses the possibility of transformation. Therefore, it must be 
understood that this foreclosure is a necessary and inevitable component of the 
existence and maintenance of the bourgeois social order, which means that 
addressing it becomes a matter of negating that order – of stepping out of the 
epistemic and ontological sphere that it sets. 
 First, we must understand that there are two possible orientations towards 
the future. The first position can be considered as present-oriented, as it is focussed 
on the reproduction of the present. The second, then, can be considered as future-
oriented, as it is focussed on the possibility and creation of the future. Bourgeois 
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ideology and modernism belong firmly in the camp of present-orientation, married 
to the relations that exist here and now. Hyperreality and capitalist realism both 
serve to bolster this position, as they present models derived from bourgeois 
relations as ontic and positively present. This is accomplished through the 
discourses of knowledge and the practices of academia, as well as through the way 
that information is presented and disseminated through documentary and 
fictional media. Present-orientation is ideologically useful to the bourgeoisie 
because its focus on keeping things the same tomorrow as they are today serves, 
logically, to keep the powerful in power (in a metastable sense). Praxis and 
projected being do not enter onto the scene under this approach, as the positivist 
epistemology that the model attaches itself to avoids the encounter with nihility 
that praxis and projection face to. Knowledge, being here attached to the same 
ontological underpinnings as the social system, can only serve to support that 
system – the two are continuous. 
 Present-orientation is deeply connected to the ideology and principles of 
modernism and the style of bourgeois thought that it supports, arising as a 
consequence of the modernist push for universal totalisation. In the quest to 
dominate and systematise all things, modernism must aim to bring knowledge into 
this system. Ontology and epistemology are connected, and the use of a certain 
approach or the development of a scientific field is related to a specific type of 
knowledge and knowing (Merleau-Ponty 1964). In order for something to be 
known, its existence (or the possibility of its existence) must be posited, an object 
must be constructed for the investigator-knower to examine. Epistemological 
claims, then, also make ontological claims. Positivism claims a style of absolute 
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knowing and, in doing so, also claims a type of absolute existence. Moreover, 
knowledge must be considered in its relation to power structures and how it allows 
or disallows the legitimation of the state form (Lyotard 1984). So, if knowledge is 
both attached to a system of ontology and shaped by the forms and relations of the 
dominant style of political power, then knowledge must be equally connected to 
the ideological superstructure that allows the propagation of power, and the 
modernist cannot help but seek to bring all knowledge into the sphere of 
modernism. Knowledge now becomes an ideological tool like any other, used to 
support the realisation of the state (Lyotard 1984). Implied, then, is a type of 
knowledge, and a type of epistemological approach to the world, that serves to 
maintain the current neoliberal capitalist order over all else – present-oriented 
knowledge. 
 Knowledge of the future is a type of knowledge. More importantly, it is an 
extremely useful type of knowledge for the ruling class, possibly the most useful in 
the construction of the statistical models and their reality that is so ideologically 
indispensable to the maintenance of power. Now, we live in a condition where the 
statistical model is always being taken as a near-divine, something that is 
indisputable and that has come to precede and overrule any experience that might 
be outside of it (Baudrillard 1991). Especially important for the neoliberal economy 
is the existence of statistical projections, which allow the manipulation of data to 
present an image of the future that comes to rule our present by guiding the 
behaviour of economic analysts, purchasers for businesses, city planners, &c. The 
meaning of statistical projections, however, depends on the meaning of statistics, 
the meaning of the fields and systems of knowledge from which those statistics are 
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derived. Again, in the making of an epistemological claim, an ontological claim is 
necessarily being made. Statistical projections of this style, by making a claim to 
have some predictive capacity for the future, imply the claim that the conditions of 
tomorrow will be similar to the conditions of today, and that nothing serious will 
change. This is married to bourgeois praxis that ensures that the current order is 
maintained through political and economic means, though these efforts are hidden 
in the language of prediction and the presentation of data. Even when something 
does change, these models tend to be concerned with things like “recovery” and the 
“return to normalcy.” Fundamentally, using statistics to model the future claims 
that the future is the ontic continuation of the past. Related to this, of course, are 
the thoughts of the end of history and of capitalist realism: today’s condition is 
capitalism, so if nothing is to change tomorrow, then capitalism must continue to 
exist – it is made coterminous with reality – and, while there are still events, there 
is no history left to be made. Projection of this style, which is central to 
neoliberalism and postmodernity, converts the future into nothing more than the 
playing out of trends in a system that is both hyperreal and metastable, an endless 
extension of the present. 
 Our future also becomes detached from our material conditions under the 
current ideological regime, which is derived from the principles of idealism. And 
again, we can look at the role of knowledge and data in how this happens. 
Reification, the treating of abstracts as concretes, becomes central at this point. 
Hyperreality is engendered by the treatment of images as truer, more realistic, 
than real experiences, allowing models and managed information to supersede 
what one actually encounters in the world (Baudrillard 1991). More or less, 
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hyperreality is a particular form of reification. In a system where we are guided by 
models of the future that reproduce the present, our actions no longer need to refer 
to the concrete world in which we live – at least, speaking at the level of society. 
But this level is itself a reification. Technocratic sociology, which aims to guide 
what ought to be done through the use of modelled knowledge, tends towards a 
focus on method over meaning and a preference for stasis over change (Adorno 
2000). To this end, the knowledge of models is applied as if it already existed, 
converting the abstract of the statistical/probabilistic future into the concrete of 
the material present. Some convergence of the material and the ideal occurs 
through mechanisms such as debt, but the basic ontological claim being made 
privileges “pure” knowledge and information over lived reality and experiences. In 
this way, also, human beings are converted from ambiguous subject/objects into 
pure objects, and real individuality is lost, though the dominant discourses of the 
system still put forth a kind of ironic individualism: “you’re unique, the same as 
everyone else.” 
 Foreclosure of the future follows on from these ontological/epistemological 
positions and practices. Because we come to understand the world as continuous 
and take the reified ideology as actual reality, the future loses its possibility. To the 
modernist and the idealist, everything must be subsumed into the model, and the 
future is no exception. Accepting this leads to the belief that there is no future, that 
everything will be the same, endlessly. However, this does not need to be our 
endpoint. By negating the central claims and presumptions of modernism and 
idealism, we can move through nihilism towards a position of future-orientation 
and a reclamation of the future as a space for projection and praxis. 
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NEGATION OF THE FUTURE 
Properly conceptualising a future-orientation means first negating the model of 
present-orientation. Responding to the entrenched and hidden epistemological 
and ontological claims underlying present-orientation, nihilism becomes a useful 
tool for us in the quest of returning to humanity. Postmodernism also become 
useful in its capacity as a nihilation of modernism. Finally, connecting our present 
circumstances back to the historical descent of modernity and postmodernity gives 
us a reason to look beyond the objective and supposedly-neutral statistical models 
of the future and towards a foundation in praxis. Combining these things allows us 
to understand the possibility and importance of the negation of the future so that 
we can move beyond the starting point of present-orientation. 
 I have already exposed the fundamental claims of present-orientation and 
how those claims lead to a reification of the statistical future and the detachment 
of this system from real conditions and existence. Now, I can start to negate these 
claims. To do so, we must return to what underlies these claims. Positivism is 
founded on the belief that all knowledge develops through stages, moving from 
theology towards positivism (Comte 2000a). Within this approach, sociology is 
presented as a field standing above all others, and its derivation was part of the 
goal of positivism; in turn, part of the goal of sociology was to develop a rational 
political approach that could be used to guide social development (Comte 2000b). 
Comte is claiming that there is an absolute law at the base of both positivism as an 
approach and sociology as a specific field and that the history of all hitherto 
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existing human knowledge is the history of positivism’s development. This is a 
serious ontological claim, and strongly evidenced: it was written by Comte in 
Comte’s book (Comte 2000a). There is some lip service here to the history of 
philosophy, but Comte largely takes the existence of his three stages and the linear 
development of knowledge as self-evident. Negation of something taken as self-
evident is trivial: we do not accept this law, this progressive development of 
knowledge towards a fixed and absolute point, as self-evident. 
 Idealism is a somewhat more complicated beast than positivism, but equally 
indispensable to the structure of bourgeois thought and modernist ideology. The 
main principle to be examined here is the capacity for Reason as a driver of the 
development of knowledge. For the idealists, it is possible for humanity to reach 
absolute knowledge and truth through the proper application of thought alone 
(Kant 1996; Hegel 1977). From this position, it makes sense that the project of 
society – indeed, of all reality – is a shared one, based on the idea that human 
nature is also contained within Reason. The problem of idealism is that it assumes 
consciousness and places consciousness above all else, a pure form floating in a 
vacuum. Consciousness of this type, however, is inconsistent with experience and 
is tautological to boot, relying on the acceptance of the implication that 
consciousness is identical with itself. This is derived, in turn, from Descartes 
(2000), who argues that things observed can be doubted and examined, but that 
existence itself cannot, and that this indubitable existence is predicated on the 
existence of god. The problem here is the existence of god: to accept the Cartesian 
cogito, we must take the existence of god as an article of faith. If, however, I 
question that fact, I am left with only my existence as a grounding. At this point, 
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however, I encounter another problem: my consciousness does not float in a 
vacuum and is, instead, revealed to me through my rejection of outside objects and 
people as Other – my consciousness is not pure, but consciousness of something 
(Sartre 1992). Consciousness in the world is always a consciousness of relation and 
negation, not a consciousness of the wholeness of all things. Pure Reason is a 
unifier that sits above specific systems, but human consciousness is always 
confronted with a given situation and relates to the world through confronting and 
defining that situation (Sartre 1992; Sartre 2004). Reason must deny this 
confrontation and relation in order to be pure and free-floating, but this also means 
that it loses its grounding in what actually exists, in what a human being can 
experience and act upon. In the end, idealism comes up against the same problem 
that Comtean positivism does: if we refuse to accept its self-evidence, it has no 
other ground. 
 Materialism is the competing position and, as an investigation into society 
and human interactions, materialism is based on examining action in the world, 
rather than the movement of abstracts above it (Marx 1978b). Here, the first 
principle is not god, essence, or reason, but the existence of the human being, and 
this principle is much more amenable to experience. We still begin from the ground 
of human existence, but now that existence is based on its identity with itself, 
rather than its identity with Reason or the identity of consciousness to 
consciousness. Materialism, then, does not rely on the same kind of mediation or 
faith that idealism does, and is actually much more in line with any kind of belief 
in observation as the ground of knowledge. Since the model of historical 
materialism is meant to be pinned to actual human behaviour and goals, there is 
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no need to appeal to otherworldly power or divinity. Instead, we can understand 
the production of knowledge and the investigation of the world as part of that 
human activity, guided by a desire both to understand and to make use of the world.  
What is lost, however, is the unity of purpose that was granted to us in the 
pursuit of Reason and idealism. We are no longer bound by a single guiding light, 
and instead we start to see different human activities interacting and conflicting. 
Different people and groups may want different things, or may want to achieve the 
same ends through different means, and so conflict becomes possible and even 
likely. If we do not accept a deterministic model, then we have to face that our 
projects, once completed, become separated from ourselves and that others may 
turn them to their own ends; however, our projects and the projection of our being 
is also the ground of our relation to others (de Beauvoir 2004). More importantly, 
though, we start to see the possibility of something different, as our conditions are 
revealed to us not as the unfolding of a universal narrative but as the result of other 
human activity. In this way, we negate the positivist and idealist claims at the heart 
of the bourgeois ideology. The positivist claim is negated because we come to 
understand the pursuit of knowledge as a human activity motivated by human 
desires. The idealist claim is negated because we recognise the development of 
history and society as the result of those human actions, rather than as the result 
of the movement of ideas. 
 Postmodernism and postmodernity return here as consequences of this 
negation and the substitution of the material for the ideal. As explained earlier, 
postmodernity is a particular form of political-economic structure that has 
emerged as a result of the gradual shoring up of capitalism as the dominant 
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economic form and the project of guaranteeing bourgeois wealth and power. This 
is connected to the bourgeoisie having human existence and emerging through 
praxis in the world, rather than having a deeper ontological status. Praxis acts as a 
relation to the given world through human action that first negates that given and 
then reaffirms some new form (Sartre 2004). Human activity of this sort always 
begins with a negation of the state of things that already exists and, through goal-
oriented activity, the creation of a more amenable condition. The basis of praxis is 
that a person or group finds they have some need or desire to fulfill, one that has 
not already been met, and then they take action to meet it (Sartre 2004; Marx and 
Engels 1998). As such, praxis always emerges as a response to some lack in the 
world, whether it be something as basic as hunger or as complicated as political 
dissent. This also includes the activity of those who want to maintain the status 
quo, as they must endeavour to prevent both the completion of competing projects 
and to manage the tendency towards practico-inertia. In terms of political 
economy, this would include the establishment and defence of a specific type of 
flow of money and the codification of particular principles in law. Such activity is 
not, however, following the plan of some divine being or metaphysical force, but is 
guided by human will and desire. Organised according to their ownership of the 
means of production, the bourgeoisie acted historically to enshrine capitalism 
within liberal democracy and, eventually, to convert the nation-state into an entity 
that would ensure the continued existence of markets even through times of crisis. 
Apprehending the emergence of postmodernity in this way, as the result of human 
praxis rather than the inevitable consequence of history, negates the principle of 
capitalist realism and separates the existence of the bourgeois from the absolute 
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course of history. Of course, the history of the bourgeoisie is the history of our 
current conditions, but that is not all that history is and it is not coterminous with 
the future. Here, we begin to regain some measure of our future by returning it to 
the playing out of material conflicts and interactions. 
 Postmodernism similarly separates modernism from its ontic reality. 
Highlighting the fact that the principles of the modernist system are not articulated 
positively, but through the rejection of what is supposedly outside of them, reveals 
the lack of actual meaning in the system, the lack of anything for it to correspond 
to except for itself. In so doing, the system is shown to be tautological and self-
referential, which negates part of its ontic claim. Examining knowledge in terms of 
its historical descent and in its relation to the political-economic system breaks the 
epistemological frame of neutrality and separation from humanity. In this way, 
postmodernism also serves to connect the present conditions to the history and 
praxis of the bourgeoisie as a class of human beings, rather than as the revelation 
of some otherworldly essence. And again, we encounter the emptiness of this 
system and, by extension, the possibility of something else. Just as modernity 
emerged from bourgeois praxis, so has modernism, and neither of these things 
exist as the sum of all possibility in the world. 
 What this leads us to, then, is a profound encounter with nihility. The 
dominant systems and conditions are surrounded by nothingness and appeal to 
hollow principles that are inconsistent with actual existence, making no reference 
to material reality and seeking only to perpetuate current power relations and the 
objectification of human beings. For the bourgeois, negating this style of present-
orientation would mean a complete negation of the future. However, since we can 
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also understand nihilism as a fundamentally dialectical movement, what this 
negation truly brings us to is the possibility of the negation-of-negation, the 
affirmation of something new. This allows us to refute the positivist critique that 
nihilism only leads to rejection and simple relativism and instead see it as a 
grounding for a radically different set of principles. It is in this sense that 
postmodernist critique, in its capacity as a form of nihilism specifically derived to 
address modernism, can give us a path forward. What is left to us is to develop a 
more complete theory of future-orientation and its relation to human 
emancipation. 
A NEW FUTURE 
At this point, our task becomes moving beyond the system offered by the bourgeois 
ideology and towards a theory of a new future. Future-orientation is a fundamental 
aspect of this approach, meant to reconceptualise how we think about possibility 
and social change. This is a part of the overall project of moving away from 
metaphysical sociology and towards a theory that is rooted in human existence and 
action, one that acknowledges the agency and creativity of human beings and that 
allows a return of subjectivity and individuality in the place of the emptying 
objectivity offered by positivism. Moreover, future-orientation is an attempt to 
move through and overcome nihilism by affirming the human through real action 
to change the world. I believe that this affirmation is necessary if we aim to take up 
the project of revolution. 
 Breaking away from present-orientation confronts us immediately with a 
negative model of the future, something that is not filled up with statistical models 
and probabilistic predictions. This should not be taken, though, as a denial of 
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history or as some rejection of the model of causality, only a rejection of the 
reification and ontological claims that were outlined earlier in this chapter. In this 
early stage, we find ourselves again at the midpoint of the dialectic and, again, 
seeking to move towards the negation of negation. A new model of this sort also 
helps us to better understand and ground a theory of revolutionary action and 
change without having to appeal to the same principles of justice, morality, &c. that 
are used to protect and project the existing bourgeois order. 
 The major loss in accepting nothingness is the loss of the necessity of 
revolution and change. Just as when we previously encountered it as part of 
nihilism more broadly, rejecting deterministic models of the future breaks down 
the equally deterministic model of revolution or change as inevitable. In reality, 
this is not actually a problem, as the possibility of change is not being foreclosed. 
We are faced instead with the charge of realising any change ourselves through our 
own praxis. In this way, the immediate negation is actually more affirmative than 
the positivist model that it is replacing. Nihilism of this sort also leads us, again, to 
a model that is more in line with certain principles of Marxist thought. The 
dialectical model of capitalism that Marxist thought provides us is a critique of 
capitalism’s internal logic, but revolution has always been left as a question of 
human action (Albritton 1986). Additionally, Marx’s oeuvre is based on the 
attempt to develop a type of philosophy that was aimed at changing the world, not 
simply explaining it (Marx 1978b). Our nihilism is responding to the bourgeois 
style of thought that goes exactly against these goals, aiming to describe a 
metaphysical world amenable to capitalism and bourgeois democracy and to make 
that description the whole of reality. Describing something in the future, be it stasis 
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or change, always involves an element of reification and an attempt to simply 
describe the world. However, we must acknowledge that it is much more difficult 
– and entails a much greater type of responsibility – to construct a model of change 
based on human freedom and praxis. Idealism, possibly because of its roots in 
Christian theology, offers a rosy image of salvation to those who accept it, and 
bourgeois propaganda often appeals to the idea that what is good for the rich is 
good for all members of society (e.g., in the doctrine of trickle-down economics). 
Historical materialism, however, points out that this is not the truth and that, in 
fact, the structural logic of capitalism is the source of alienation and immiseration 
for the members of the proletariat (Marx 1959). Conflict of this type cannot be 
easily resolved in a universalist framework, or under the epistemological 
compatibilism that positivism suggests. If the goals of the bourgeoisie were 
ultimately to be the same as the goals of the proletariat – as appeals to Reason 
would suggest they are – then class conflict would not need to appear on the scene 
at all. Taking instead the position that there is some incompatibility between the 
projects of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat suggests that there is no 
greater universal form that reconciles the two. In this sense, the incompatibilist 
position of nihilism aligns with the rejection of bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
socialism. These are forms of socialism, rejected by Marx and Engels (2002), that 
aimed to resolve the conditions of capitalism without also destroying the material 
conditions underlying the class structure of society; that is, these were 
undialectical forms of socialism that did not move towards the affirmation of 
something new. In nihilism, we do lose the principles that would allow this type of 
reconciliation, but we gain instead the possibility of real and worldly praxis that 
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would move us forward. Ultimately, the loss we face is again only a loss of the 
appeal to universal principles – which is exactly the loss we seek. 
 Rather than looking to metaphysical principles and the realisation in this 
world, future-orientation is based in projected human being and the realisation of 
projects through praxis. The model of projected being emerges from the encounter 
with nothingness: in existing, a person is constantly having to face the limits of 
their current being and take on tasks that are oriented to, and justified by, the 
desire to create a particular new form of being in the future (Sartre 2004). Whereas 
present-orientation aimed to reproduce the present in the future, future-
orientation aims at producing the future by moving away from the present. A desire 
for change is implicit in this model, though these changes may be great or small in 
scale, and there is no mechanism for change available to us but our own action (our 
own praxis). Conflict is likely to emerge here, rather than agreement through the 
rigorous use of Reason, but conflict is also nothing new for us, as our situation 
within capitalism puts us always already in conflict with others. Under the regime 
of capitalist realism, however, we now find a chance to oppose ourselves to the 
“reality” of the world in both project and in action, and create something new by 
negating the old. Future-orientation, in this way, returns to humanity a level of 
agency and creativity that is lost in the appeal to Reason, as we no longer have to 
agree with powerful or argue with them in arenas that they have created to give 
them advantage over us. 
 In fact, we can begin to envision an entirely new form of subjectivity and a 
new understanding of the social relation that emerges to us as we move through 
nihilism towards future-orientation. In simplest terms, nihilism brings us into 
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confrontation with the objectification of people that follows as a consequence of 
the appeal to Reason and to universality. If all knowledge and action is guided by 
absolute principles or universal laws, then all knowledge and action can be reduced 
to the objects of Reason (objectified in Reason). Nothing outside of Reason 
becomes possible. And if, as the bourgeois ideology and science would have it, 
those principles are amenable to the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class and 
capitalism as an economic system at the end of history, then the existence of this 
system is absolutely right. Simple materialism that accepts the reified 
determination of the future has the same problem, even if it predicts a communist 
revolution, as it commits a type of elision. For thinkers of this type, the future 
revolution is inevitable – but inevitability of this type is always reification, the 
taking of something that may exist in the future as if it exists in the present. In so 
doing, declaring revolution inevitable is the same as declaring action unnecessary. 
This is a problem of determinism, rather than materialism or idealism, which is 
the elision to which I alluded to earlier: reification has been left out of the 
discussion in the pursuit of “good materialism.” But this reification is, in fact, 
indispensable to the position of inevitability, and it entails the exact same 
objectification that justifies bourgeois rule. Human beings are reduced again to 
mere objects, this time of a superhuman “material dialectic” and, therefore, God is 
returned to His heaven and the system is again made absolutely right. This 
problem of reification can only be escaped if we break away from the positivist style 
to which it is married and return a degree of subjectivity and agency to human 
beings (though, following the existentialists, we still take this freedom as situated). 
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In a theory of praxis, we cannot be led to appeal to anything other than praxis as 
the driver of history, even though this might make revolution more difficult. 
 Ultimately, we only come to proper future-orientation through the 
encounter with nihilism. Postmodernism, because it critiques and begins to break 
with modernism, offers us a more useful path forward to this end than the 
positivists would allow. Change and revolution are revealed here to be possible, 
though not guaranteed, if human beings take these things seriously and commit, 
through praxis, to their realisation in the world. By losing the appeal to grand 
narrative and universal Reason, we gain instead the possibility to make real change 
in the world as soon as we seize the opportunity for ourselves. 
INTEGRATION 
Everything I have presented to this point must be understood in the context of 
responding to bourgeois ideology and bourgeois domination of society and the 
attempt to change social conditions. If there is to be a revolution in the future, it 
must be undertaken by human beings, not left to a belief in something (or 
someone) else, and it must be much more comprehensive than a simple 
reorganisation of economic distribution. Such a complete breaking away requires, 
however, a system of values and thought that escapes the one which currently 
dominates life. This is a major undertaking, and one that simply cannot be pursued 
while remaining married to the principles of the Enlightenment that are baked into 
bourgeois thought. 
 Through the critique of nihilism, which is fundamentally an immanent 
critique of universalist thought, the potential to reject the basic assumptions of 
bourgeois ideology is revealed to us. However, we also see that it is key to pursue 
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active nihilism. A true alternative theory does not just reject what it opposes, but 
pursues the development of something else. Change goes further than destruction. 
This going-further, however, ought to be pursued in terms of self-overcoming. 
Pursuit of active nihilism means accepting the self-destruction of the dominant 
system’s values but, more importantly, the accepting of that self-destruction as the 
ground for accepting something new. Postmodernism is an approach that, as a 
form of nihilism, offers a bridge towards this acceptance of the new. 
 Capitalism and bourgeois ideology are inextricably linked, both parts of the 
bourgeois domination of society. As such, they are the context of the entire 
revolutionary project in contemporary society. There is no question in my mind as 
to the rehabilitation of the Enlightenment or the repair of capitalism. These things 
are impossible. Moreover, they are not worth pursuing, since their establishment 
and continuation incorporate the principles of the bourgeoisie from the very 
beginning. If there is, after all, conflict between the classes, then the goals of the 
proletariat cannot be subordinated to the beliefs of the bourgeoisie. 
The possibility of revolution hinges upon the possibility of escaping the 
present and creating something new in the future. From a materialist perspective, 
this creating has to be understood as a human act, motivated by human will and 
desire. With this in mind, I find that it is impossible to properly conceive of 
revolution while accepting that there is some universal force or principle hanging 
over humanity. As such, I contend that it is only truly possible to have revolution 
by following through the nihilist project towards active nihilism. If we accept the 
worldly necessity of human activity and power, revolutionary possibility is 
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returned to us. If we remain, however, in the thrall of Reason, we will accomplish 
nothing and die. 
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CONCLUSION 
The question of whether or not there will be a revolution in the future, and what 
exactly that revolution might look like, is still open. However, any possibility of 
revolution must be linked back to human praxis and human existence. Revolution 
is, necessarily, revolution against a dominant condition and, in contemporary 
society, that means a revolution against the capitalist social order and bourgeois 
domination. Because this order and this domination are derived from 
Enlightenment thought and are maintained through the ideology of modernism, 
there is no appeal to be made to the principles of those modes of thought. Instead, 
we must look outside of and beyond the systems of domination if there is to be any 
real change in the world. Fundamentally, that change is possible, but it must be 
human beings that make it happen and it must be oriented to human ends. 
 Nihilism, rather than being a simple rejection of what exists, acts as a 
negation of one condition towards the affirmation of a new one. In this sense, it 
becomes a valuable tool in the construction of a revolutionary model. Positivism 
and universalism, with their tendency towards abstraction and their principle of 
perfectibility, do not offer the ground for a revolutionary theory. Following those 
paths can only ever lead us away from human activity, into faith in the divine and 
quietism regarding worldly conditions. Proper negation of the system, and a 
proper move beyond it, require an acceptance of the system’s groundlessness and 
emptiness. If we are to be revolutionary, we cannot make it our goal to find a way 
of rehabilitating the system; we must set ourselves against it from the ground up. 
It is only in this way, through the pursuit of active nihilism, that I see any 
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revolutionary potential in contemporary society. It is not enough to try to restore 
the origins of the Enlightenment, or the revolutionary aspect of early capitalism, 
since these projects maintain the element of bourgeois thought that originally gave 
rise to them. Instead, we have to find a new ground and a new goal for ourselves. 
Revolution must be both comprehensive and radically different. 
 Taking up the project of revolution also requires a fundamental shift in how 
we relate to the future. The bourgeois and the positivist reduce the future to the 
continuation of the present; as such, the revolutionary must also reject this 
continuation. Determinism acts as nothing but a principle to maintain the relation 
of dominance, and it is precisely this relation that revolution is set against. 
Regarding the future as an open space, one in which we can inscribe our wills and 
our values through our actions, is a necessary step in changing our world. This is a 
model that is incompatible with a probabilistic and statistical approach to life, and 
it is also a model that rejects the safety and security of social perfection. Real praxis 
is always based on the negation of what is for what ought to be, and revolution is 
no different. We cannot be sure that our ideals will be shared by others, and we 
cannot be sure that our projects will be completed if we do not actively pursue their 
completion. Instead, we must take those projects into the future actively. 
 Postmodernity is not the end of revolutionary possibility, and 
postmodernism is not the end of revolutionary thought. Even now that the Soviet 
Union has collapsed and the state has been so fully attached to ensuring the 
stability of the capitalist economy, human beings have not ceased to exist. 
Capitalism has not become stable, it has become metastable: the contradictions 
and alienation still exist, and change is still possible. However, this change will not 
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come to us through Reason. And even with the loss of absolute truth and universal 
values in postmodernism, we do not lose the capacity to critique. Instead, we gain 
the capacity to affirm our own values, to integrate the epistemological with the 
human, and to avoid the transformation of statistics into ontic reality. These are 
also the goals of revolution: not just a reorganisation of economic spoils, but a 
radical change in the nature of the system. 
GOING FORWARD 
This essay is far from the last word on revolution, its form, and the meaning it has 
for human beings in the world. As a starting point, I have offered a theoretical 
reconciliation of my positions, but the exploration of the essay’s themes is far from 
complete. The problem of connecting these different strands of thought, each of 
which has captured my interest and attention, is one that has long weighed on my 
mind. Even now, though, I feel my investigation has still only begun. At this point, 
I see three paths to be pursued in the future. One examines the shape and 
importance of the new style of subjectivity implied by the revolutionary project and 
the rejection of bourgeois models and understanding of the world. The second 
addresses the form of the new sociology that emerges when knowledge and social 
management are to be extricated from bourgeois dominance. The third looks at the 
relation between ethics and human existence in a world that is not guided by a 
belief in perfectibility. I view all of these as indispensable examinations if the 
theory I have begun to develop here is to be worked through to its fullest intentions. 
These three issues are also connected to each other, as they issue from the overall 
project of constructing a new understanding of the world. Since subjectivity, 
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sociology, and ethics have been discussed and deployed under the current order, 
shifts in their form under a new order would also be interlinked. 
THE NEW SUBJECTIVITY 
Something that I must leave for another investigation and another time is the 
theoretical model of the new type of subject that follows on from the principles and 
the goals described in this essay. Revolutionary praxis of the style I have described 
is incompatible with essentialist models of human being and with the objectifying 
style of universalist epistemology. Instead, revolution entails a return to 
subjectivity, but not just subjectivity in the way that it is understood by bourgeois 
society. Human will cannot be pursued under a paradigm that denies its very 
existence, the way bourgeois rationality does, so revolution must establish 
something that escapes that understanding of humanity.  
 At the same time, however, because revolution aims at creating something 
radically new and because the way we understand ourselves and others is tied to 
the facticity of our lives, it becomes difficult to comprehend exactly what a post-
revolutionary subjectivity might look like. Under bourgeois domination, we have 
lost a great deal of understanding of what it is to be human – possibly all 
understanding. The history of capitalism has been quite long, when seen from the 
perspective of human life: multiple generations have been born and have died 
under the bootheel of the bourgeoisie, and alienation has become integrated into 
our very understanding of ourselves. 
 With this in mind, a theory of the new subjectivity – both its form and its 
meaning in human understanding and the intelligibility of the world overall – is 
something that warrants further pursuit. Additionally, further developing this 
121 
 
 
 
aspect of humanity will allow a further development of the theory of revolution 
overall. The model of the new subjectivity will also allow an explanation of how 
people come to develop class consciousness and concretely take up the project of 
revolution. This is one thing to be pursued in the future. 
THE NEW SOCIOLOGY 
The nature of the social, the mechanisms of its construction, and its ultimate 
trajectory are also brought into question when taking up the nihilist-revolutionary 
standpoint outlined in this essay. Sociology has been deeply connected to the 
bourgeois society in which it first emerged, and has often been formulated and 
deployed towards the maintenance of the bourgeois order. Turning sociology 
against this means that it will be necessary to re-examine the assumptions and 
methods used in the field. Removing the aspect of a second-order society, 
something that exists above and outside of human behaviour or belief, is also 
implied in this project. A return to the principles of Marx’s earlier works is 
connected with this new sociological approach, and not all prior work in the 
discipline needs to be abandoned, but things cannot be allowed to continue 
without examination. 
 Dropping positivism and the aim of creating reified statistical models is 
another shift that will have a major impact on the pursuit of sociology. This is part 
of a larger change in our attitude toward the pursuit of science, something that is 
pressed by both nihilists and postmodernists. No longer is the pursuit of science 
the pursuit of revealing absolute knowledge; instead, we must acknowledge that 
we are creating knowledge through praxis and that it is inseparable from human 
will and power. The full impact of this shift remains to be seen. 
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THE NEW ETHICS 
The ethical realm is another that is problematised by the shift away from a 
universalist standpoint. Appeals to principles of things like justice and right, if they 
are to be taken as appeals to something superhuman, have to be left behind in the 
turn to nihilism. Strictly speaking, this is not a new concern – the shape of ethics 
in a non-determined and non-essential world is one that has been taken up by 
many philosophers in the past. In the context of revolution, though, this is still an 
especially important area for investigation and elaboration. Especially under 
positivism, revolution has often been defended in terms of ethical appeal to 
universal principles, and this is something that will be lost if those principles are 
set aside. 
 Connecting the shape of the future directly to human activity and projects 
poses a problem for the universalist model of ethics, since it is deeply connected to 
a belief in perfectibility and to the idea of different projects as reconcilable. 
Understanding projects and the future as created by human beings for human 
purposes means accepting that those projects will sometimes be at cross-purposes 
and that the resulting conflict will be settled through power relations. Revolution 
must also be understood in this light, as a reconfiguration of power rather than its 
annihilation. Losing the aspects of perfectibility and inevitability means dealing 
with all human activity, including revolution, as something that is contingent and 
open to critique. Justification of action, then, requires a further examination of the 
future – without universal grounding, some alternative framework must be laid to 
defend decisions.  
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